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OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW:
A PRIMER FOR BUSINESSMEN AND ATTORNEYS
by
Joseph Jude Norton*

O VER
the past seventeen years American business and commercial interests
within the European Community have been

substantial.' In terms of
trade, recent figures indicate that the community purchased twenty-five percent of all United States exports and the United States purchased twenty-

three percent of all Community exports. 2 If the current trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) s prove
even modestly successful, the dollar value of import-export activity between
the United States and the European Community undoubtedly will increase in
the future. 4 In terms of direct investment, in 1958 American business
directly invested approximately 1.9 billion dollars in the original Community; 5 in 1972 the estimated book value of direct American investments in the
expanded Community of Nine was 26 billion dollars. 6 At present, American
direct investments account for approximately one-seventh of all new industri7
al investments within the Community.
* LL.B., University of Edinburgh (Scotland); LL.M., University of Texas; LL.M.,
S.J.D., University of Michigan. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas; Lecturer, Southern
Methodist University School of Law.
1. In formal terms the "European Community" comprises the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). As used in this Article, however, "European Community" will be interchangeable with the EEC (i.e., the Common Market) unless otherwise specified. The European Community presently consists of nine member
states: the six original members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands), and the three new acceding members as of 1973 (Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom). Norway, which had previously signed the Treaty of Accession, vetoed entry into the Community by a popular referendum in the fall of 1972.
2. See generally European Community Information Memo, "The European Community and the United States in 1973" (Nov. 1973).
3. GATT is a multinational agreement formed for the purpose of regulating international trade. It is rooted in specific legal obligations undertaken by the contracting
parties. It specifies definite contractual norms and a multilateral mechanism (i.e., an
organization) for coping with international trade problems. For a detailed analysis of
GAT see K. DAM, THE GATT"-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

(1970); J.

JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF

GATT (1969).

For a considera-

tion of the status of GATT in United States domestic law see Jackson, The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249
(1967).
4. For the basis of the Community's approach to new GAIT negotiations see Development of an Overall Approach to Trade in View of the Coming MultilateralNegoti-

ations in GATT, [1973]

BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN

CoMMUNITIES

Supp. No. 2

[hereinafter cited as BULL. E.C.] (memorandum from the Commission to the Council forwarded on April 9, 1973, and amended May 22, 1973). See also Friedeberg, The Nixon
Round Officially Launched, 10 CoMM. MKT. L. REv. 368 (1973).
5. European Community Information Service, The European Community and the
United States in 1973, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. IT9621 (1973).
6. Leaflet issued by the European Community Information Service, The European
Community at a Glance, Jan. 1974.
7. For an analysis of the scope of American direct investment in the Community,
see Haekkerup & Rohner, Report on TransatlanticDirect Investment, Eur. Consult. Ass.,
23d Sess., Doc. No. 2938, 1 Does. 2938 (1971). For updated statistics consult the European Community Statistical Office.
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In view of the monetary interest reflected by these statistics, a working
understanding of the Community's commercial and business laws would
seem of interest to Americans investing in Europe. Accordingly, this Article
is designed to highlight those aspects of the evolving body of law known as
"European Community law" which are directly relevant to the American
businessman and attorney having or developing business and commercial
relationships within the Community.8 After a brief overview of the legal and
institutional underpinnings of the Community, consideration is given to the
following matters: (1) the specific Community laws affecting the basic forms
of American business activities within the Community (i.e., import and
export of goods, licensing arrangements, and the establishment of branches
and subsidiaries); (2) the pervasive impact of European Community antitrust laws on American business activities and investment endeavors within
the Community; and (3) certain other areas of Community law (e.g.,
company and tax laws) which have a direct effect upon American business
activities and investments. The Article concludes with a statement of the
author's opinions concerning the probable effect of the further evolution of
Community commercial and business laws on American business activities
abroad.
I.

TREATY OF ROME AS CONSTITUTION OF THE

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The primary positive source of Community law is the Treaty of Rome 9
which established the Community in 1958.10 Despite the complexity of its
8. As an aid in understanding the dimensions of the Community the
following
comparative statistics (1971 data) may prove helpful:
Present
Original
Community
Community
U.S.A.
of Nine
of Six
3,600
589
449
Area (thousand sq. miles)
207
253
190
Population (millions)
84.1
104.4
75.9
Civilian Labor Force (millions)
4.1
9.9
12.1
% in agriculture
29.0
43.7
43.9
% in industry
61.1
44.3
42.2
% in services
GNP ($ billion)

Exports (% of world
total) (1972)
Imports (% of world
total) (1972)
U.S. direct investment
in Community
•($ billion) (1972).
Community investment in U.S.
($ billion) (1972)
See note 6 supra.

485

626

993.3

17.3

20.6

14

15

19.3

14.7

15.7

25.9

-

-

-

8.3

9. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298

U.N.T.S. 11 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]. As of Jan.
1, 1973, official texts of the Treaty exist in the Danish, Dutch, English, French, Gaelic

(Irish), German, and Italian languages.

However, only the Dutch, French, German,

and Italian versions, which were signed and ratified, have legal authority.

The text re-

ferred to in this study is the official English version as made available through the Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities.
10. The Coal and Steel Community Treaty was the precursor to the EEC.

See

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
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248 articles, which cover a variety of economic and non-economic activities,
the Treaty is a skeletal form of treaty ("traite cadre"), with lacunae filled in
by secondary sources of law. These secondary sources of Community law are
the various regulations, directives and decisions of the Council of the
Ministers and the European Commission, the decisions of the European
Court of Justice, the resolutions of the European Assembly, and the general
principles of law among the member states. 1
Essentially the Treaty puts forth provisions and schedules for the purpose
of creating a customs union and removing internal barriers to the free
movement of goods and services. 1 2 To achieve this end the Treaty attempts
to guarantee four basic economic freedoms throughout the Community:
freedom of movement of goods,' 5 freedom of movement of labor,' 4 freedom
of establishment and in the supply of services,15 and freedom of movement
of capital. 16 In support of these freedoms the Treaty proposes the establishment of common Community policies in the areas of agriculture, 17 external
trade, 18 and transportation, 19 and provides specific rules regarding competition. 20 Through the establishment of these basic freedoms and common
policies, the Treaty of Rome aims "to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of
21
living and closer relations between its member states.
The thrust of the Treaty of Rome is "economic" in the broadest context of that term, and to understand the long-term significance of the
European Community, the Treaty must not be viewed simply as a traditional
international economic treaty. The Treaty is concerned not only with the
movement of goods and services, but with a "bundle" of economic and noneconomic activities. 22 It establishes areas of Community competence not
U.N.T.S. 140.

For further consideration see W. DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A
(1959); L. LIsTER, EUROPE'S COAL &

STUDY IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1950-1959

STEEL COMMUNITY, AN EXPERIMENT IN ECONOMIC UNION (1960); H.

ScHM~rr,

THE

PATH TO EUROPEAN UNION (1962).

Contemporaneous with the EEC Treaty is the Euratom Treaty.

See Treaty Estab-

lishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167
(1958).
For further consideration see Mathijsen, Some Legal Aspects of Euratom, 3
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 326 (1965).

For official English translations of the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom Treaties see Trea-

ties Establishing the European Communities, Treaties Amending these Treaties, Documents Concerning the Accession (Office for Official Pub. of the Eur. Com. 1973).
11. See A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW 56 (1973).
12. See text accompanying notes 31-40 infra.
13. Treaty of Rome arts. 9-37; see text accompanying notes 31-40 infra.

14. Treaty of Rome arts. 48-51.

15. Id. arts. 52-66; see text accompanying notes 86-98 infra.
16. Treaty of Rome arts. 67-73.
17. Id. arts. 38-47; see text accompanying notes 41-50 infra.

18. Treaty of Rome arts. 110-16; see text accompanying notes 51-59 infra.
19. Treaty of Rome arts. 74-84.

For consideration of the development of transpor-

tation policy, see generally N. DnPicsr, THE TRANSPORT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrres (1969).
20. Treaty of Rome arts. 85-94; see text accompanying notes 72-84, 99-154 infra.
21. Treaty of Rome art. 2.
22. The standard English language commentary on the Treaty is A. CAMPBELL,
COMMON MARKET LAW (1969) (three volumes with annual supplements). Of particular
value to the American businessman and attorney is the CCH Common Market Reporter which contains commentary on the treaties and English versions of various rele-
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only in direct economic matters, but also in various social and de facto
political matters, many of which have a direct and immediate impact upon the

lives of the two hundred and fifty million Europeans within the Community
and upon American investment activities in the Community. 23 Indeed, in its
full historical and political context, the Treaty is in fact an -incipient form of
constitution establishing the basis for a new "governance" of Western

Europe. 24 It not only creates obligations between the member states but also
establishes a separate and distinct legal order in and of itself. 25 As evidenced
by the decisional law of the European Court of Justice, the Community
constitutes a legal order whose law is binding upon the member states and
which in many circumstances permeates the existing legal order of each
member state to become directly and immediately applicable to their nationals. 26 The Community law takes precedence over conflicting national law,
whether the conflicting national law was enacted before or after the Commu-

nity law. 27 This so-called doctrine of the supremacy of Community law has
achieved a general acceptance, with certain exceptions, among the national
judiciaries of the member states. 28 Thus, while the Treaty of Rome has
established a practical structure to tackle immediate economic problems of a
limited scope, it also has initiated an "irreversible" process for the creation of

29
a new Western European economic (and perceivably political) order.

vant Community documents, case law, and developments. The most comprehensive and
analytical commentary is J. M1kGRET, J.-V. Louis, D. VIGNES & M. WAELBROECK, LE
DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE ]tUROPEENE (1970) (presently four volumes)
[hereinafter cited as MtGRET].
23. For general background into the nature of the Community see M. BATHHURST,
K.

SIMMONDS, W. HUNNINGS & J. WELCH, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY (1972); M. CAMPS, EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE SIXTIEs (1966); W.
JENSEN, THE COMMON MARKET (1957); P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THERMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1973); U. KITZINGER,
THE CHALLENGE, OF THE COMMON MARKET (1966); D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(1973); K.

LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1974); P. MATHIJSEN,
A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1972); R. MAYNE, THE RECOVERY OF
EUROPE (1970); A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW (1973); A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 1973); E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW & INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC
AREA (1967); D. SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COMMON MARKET (1971).
24. Mitchell, The Governance of Europe-A New Dimension in International Relations, in BRITAIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (1971) (Heriot-Watt University Lectures).
25. See generally Pescatore, International Law and Community Law, A Comparative Analysis, 7 CoMM. MKT. L. REV. 167 (1970).
26. The classic statement of the nature of Community law can be found in Costa
v. ENEL, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 455, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
MKT. REP.
8023, at 7390-91 (1964) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 61/64). For a
more recent consideration of the point by the European Court of Justice see Intemationale Handelsegellschaft v. EVSC, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255, 283, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8126 (1972).
27. For general consideration see Bebr, Law of the European Communities and Municipal Law, 33 MOD. L. REv. 481 (1971).
28. For municipal courts' acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy see Minister for
Economic Affairs v. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse "Le Ski," 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 330 (Belgian Court of Cessation, May 27, 1971). However, in certain of the member states
(e.g., Germany and Italy) serious doubts exist as to whether Community law will take
precedence over conflicting municipal constitutional laws. For discussion of certain
municipal court decisions involving the question of the supremacy of Community law,
see Bebr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts, 11 COMM. MKT.
L. REV. 3 (1974).
29. See Final Communiqu6 of the Conference of the Heads of State or Government
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Moreover, the Treaty, in terms of institutional underpinnings, has subtly
introduced a full political apparatus-executive, legislative, and judicial-into
a limited sphere of economic operation with the sensitivity and capacity to
0
respond to further pressures for a deepening of the integration process.3
II.

COMMUNITY LAWS AFFECTING MODES OF DOING BUSINESS

The primary modes for conducting international business activities are:
(1) trade via imports and exports, (2) licensing arrangements, and (3) the
and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the European Community
at the Hague on December 1 and 2, 1969, [1970] BULL. E.C. No. 1, at 12.
30. The primary governing institutions of the Community (since 1967, common
to the EEC, ECSC, or Euratom) are:
(1) The European Assembly (often referred to as the "European Parliament," but
distinct from the Council of Europe) consists of 198 members selected by the various
parliaments of the nine member states, with the breakdown by nationality being Italy,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 36 members each, Belgium and the Netherlands 14 each, Denmark and Ireland 10 each, and Luxembourg 6. The Assembly, which
meets monthly at Strasbourg, presently has only minimal effective political power in the
Community's decision-making process. Although it has certain advisory and consultative functions and possesses a limited competence in the matter of budgetary controls,
the main tasks of the Assembly are the rendering of standing committee reports and the
questioning of members of the European Commission visiting from Brussels. Article
138(3) of the Treaty of Rome perceives the eventual direct universal election of Assembly members, though apparently this is still a distant vision.
(2) The Council of Ministers consists of any council of cabinet ministers from the
member states, coming together in Brussels primarily to discuss Commission proposals.
For the consideration of the more important matters of Community planning and affairs,
the respective foreign ministers will meet approximately once a month. In principle,
the Treaty of Rome conceives of the Council as the principle decision-making organ in
the Community and it is the primary decision-maker with regard to major economic and
political decisions on Community policy. In the daily operation of the Community,
however, the Council often serves more as a senate, acting on various proposals submitted by the European Commission.
(3) The European Commission presently consists of thirteen members, nationals of
the member states selected for their general competence and independence. Assisted by
a staff of approximately 7,000 "eurocrats" centered in the Batiment Berlayment in Brussels, the Commission is the prime initiator and formulator of Community actions and
policies. Each member holds office for five years, the president and vice president being
appointed for two years.
(4) The European Court of Justice is composed of nine judges (assisted by four advocates-general) sitting in Luxembourg and endeavors to ensure that "the law is observed in the interpretation and implementation" of the EEC, Euratom, and ECSC treaties. The judges are appointed for six-year terms, there being an alternative turnover
or renewal of appointments for five judges and two advocates-general and four judges
and two advocates-general every three years.
In addition to the above institutions, other Community organs of importance in the
decision-making area are the Committee of Permanent Representatives, composed of representatives of the member states appointed by the Council of Ministers to serve as a
liason between the Council and Commission, and various types of management committees.
For readings on the institutional aspects of the Community see COCKS, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1973); D. COOMBES, POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY:
A PORTRAIT OF THE CoMMISSION OF THE EEC (1970); EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE CASE FOR ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969); A. GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY
JURISPRUDENCE: THE WORK OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1969); E. NOEL, How THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS WORK (1972); D. VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1965) (2 vols.); E. WALL, THE CoURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1966); Houben, Les Consul de Ministres des Communautis europ4ennes:
thgorie et realitg, 3 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE oROIT EUR 1 (1967); Noel, The Committee
of Permanent Representatives, 5 J. COMM. MKT. STUDIES 219 (1967).
For political
science views see S. HOLT, THE COMMON MARKET: THE CONFLICT OF THEORY AND
PRACTICE

(1967); L. LINDBERG

& S. SCHEINGOLD, EUROPE'S WOULD BE POLITY

(1970).
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direct establishment of offices, branches, or subsidiaries abroad. This section
will examine the effect Community laws have on these forms of doing
business, particularly with regard to the specific problems posed for the
American businessman.
A.

Trade Measures

The basic relationship of the American exporter to the Community is
preconditioned by various factors: (1) the customs union nature of the
Community, (2) the special Community regime for agricultural products,
and (3) the extent of the Community's powers with respect to the establishment and maintenance of a common commercial policy.
The Customs Union. At the economic heart of the Community is the notion
of a customs union. 3 ' As required by the Treaty of Rome: "The Community
shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods and
which shall involve the prohibition between member states of customs duties
on imports and exports and all charges having equivalent effect, and the
adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries."'3 2 Complementing the Treaty's formal concept of a customs union are
its provisions eliminating quantitative restrictions and equivalent measures
between the member states. Thus the twin aspects of the Community's
customs union are a common external tariff wall vis-h-vis non-member
nations and the elimination of trade barriers and equivalent measures between
the member states themselves. 3 Consequently, American imports into any
part of the Community face the imposition of a common external tariff
34
(CET), while Community goods do not encounter such a barrier.
With respect to the CET, the Treaty provides that the member states can
impose upon goods originating from non-member countries only those
charges which are agreed upon by the Community. The level of customs
duties for each year is determined by an annual consolidating regulation of
the Council of Ministers. An alteration in the CET can only be enacted by a
unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers; unilateral actions by the
35
member states are prohibited.
Once the CET has been paid and other import formalities satisfied the
goods of non-member countries (e.g., the United States) are considered "in
31. See generally Mennens, The Common Customs Tariff of the European Economic Community, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 73 (1967); Quin, The Establishment of the
Customs Union, in 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A
LEGAL PROFILE 101 (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds. 1960).
For fundamental theory of
a customs union see J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950).
32. Treaty of Rome art. 9.

33. See Treaty of Rome tit. 1.
34. See Council of Ministers Regulation 950/68, 11 E.E.C. J.0. L172, at 1 (1968).
For further consideration see Amphoux, Customs Legislation in the EEC, 6 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 133 (1972).

The CET was established in 1968, more than a year before the end of the transitional

period. Treaty of Rome art. 28 (note that upon, a proposal from the Commission, the
Council may so act by a "qualified majority" vote).

35. For consideration of the overall effect of the CET on American imports see generally EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THEIR COMMON INTERESTS

(1973).
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free circulation" in the Community. 6 The term "free circulation" means
that all custom duties and quantitative restrictions and measures having
equivalent effect are eliminated between member states. In determining what
constitutes "measures having equivalent effect," the main factor which
characterizes a measure as "equivalent" is its economic effect, and not its
formal legal intent.3 7 The court has emphasized that exceptions to the
Treaty of Rome's provisions on the free movement of goods are to be

narrowly construed 38 and that these provisions apply to all "goods" (in the
broadest economic context of the term) which have "originated" within the
Community or which have met the requisite entry requirements. 39 Moreover, -these provisions in 'large part have been held directly applicable within
the member states by the European Court of Justice and may be invoked by
40
private parties before the municipal courts of the member states.
The Common Agricultural Policy. While the Treaty of Rome's provisions
concerning the free movement of goods are generally applicable to trade in

agricultural products between the member states, 41 the Treaty additionally
provides for the establishment of a common Community agricultural policy
(CAP).4 2 For various political and economic reasons, the CAP has been the
most dynamic element of Community "supranational" activity and has
resulted in genuine Community control over agricultural products within the
Community. 43
The basic principles upon which the CAP was to be built are: (1) increase
in agricultural productivity; (2) insurance of a safe standard of living for those
working on the land; (3) stabilization of agricultural markets; and (4)
insurance of reasonable prices to consumers. 44 While theoretically the above
principles appear capable of producing a harmonious and viable agricultural

36. See Treaty of Rome art. 10(1).
37. See Re Export Tax on Art Treasures: E.C. Comm'n v. Italy, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 1, 9, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MET. REP.
8057, at 7881 (1969)
(Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 7/68): "By goods . . . must be understood products
which can be valued in money and which are capable as such, of forming the subject
of commercial transactions."
38. See Salgoil Sp. A. v. Foreign Trade Ministry of the Italian Republic, 8 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 181, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MEcr. RaP.
8072 (1968)
(Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 13/68).
39. See Eunomia di Porro & Co. v. Ministry of Education of the Italian Republic,
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 4, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8148
(1973) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 18/71).
40. See Marimex Sp. A. v. Italian Ministry of Finance, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 486,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8176 (1973)
(Eur. Ct. of
Justice Case No. 29/72).
41. See EEC Comm'n v. Luxembourg & Belgium, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 58, [19611966 Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
8028 (1965) (Eur. Ct. of Justice
Case Nos. 90 & 91/63).
42. Treaty of Rome arts. 38-47.
43. It should be noted in simple political terms that in 1958 at the time of creation
of the EEC, 20% of the working population of the Community was engaged in farming.
In fact, as of 1972 those making their living directly from the land still constituted 14%
of the total employment in the original six member states. Accordingly, the CAP was
of primary import in the overall development of the Common Market. Moreover, the
CAP was of particular political concern to France which has a very high proportion of
farmers, such farmers wielding critical political power for the Gaullist regimes. Accordingly, agriculture was one area where Fiance was willing to push forward on a Community level.
44. See Treaty of Rome art. 39.
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policy, in practice they have proved to be conflicting. For example, the
Community has not been able to reconcile the structural changes in Western
European agricultural practice needed to permit optimum production and
fair consumer prices with the economic demands of European farmers, many
of whom are marginal farmers yet wield considerable political influence in
their member states. The result has been that structural adaptations until
recently have taken a backseat to the maintenance of a common price policy.
Accordingly, without balanced development in structural changes, the common market organization for agriculture has generated a high price regime. 45
Of particular concern to the American exporter of agricultural products is
the fact that the common market mechanisms adopted to effectuate the

principles of CAP are to a large extent protectionist. These mechanisms
range from full price guarantees, (e.g., grain) to partial guarantees (e.g.,
beef), to reliance solely upon the common external tariff without any price
guarantees (e.g., fats), but their common goal is to provide a predictable
income to producers and distributors by means of a high price regime which
discriminates against cheaper non-Community products.4 6 A prime example
of the protectionist nature of the CAP can be seen in the market organization for grains, the prototype Community organization. 47 The thrust of this
common organization is in terms of a "target" price, and a variable levy
which shields the Community market from foreign imports, both of which
are geared to raise the import price to the target price level. 48 Further inter45. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
(1973); Norton, The Heart of the Matter: U.K. and the E.E.C., The Problem of Agriculture, 6 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 221 (1971); Olmi, Agriculture and Fisheries in the Treaty
of Brussels of January 22, 1972, 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 293 (1972); Olmi, Common
Organizationof Agricultural Markets at the Stage of the Single Market, 5 COMM. MKT.
L. REV. 359 (1967-68).
46. For an attempt to ameliorate the protectionist nature of the CAP see commentary in THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THEIR COMMON INTERESTS 26-29 (1973).
47. See Council Regulation No. 120/67, 10 E.E.C. J.O. 2269 (1967), as amended
by Regulation No. 969/68, 11 E.E.C. J.O. 166/6 (1968).
48. The following definitions may prove helpful:
(1) Common External Tariff. This is the protective tariff, which is partially special
protective tariff and partially levy, which a non-Community exporter must pay to get
his goods into the Community.
(2) Target Price (Prix indicatif). This is the price level projected for a commodity
at the wholesale stage in the "area of greatest deficit." This price is generally fixed
at the beginning of the sowing season, although it may be seasonally adjusted to reflect
storage costs. It is intended that this set price will aid the farmers in planning production and in serving as a market guide to all market users. This price is determined in
the marketing centre of the Community with the least domestic supplies-political price.
(3) Threshold Price (Prix de seuil). This is the price used as a basis for determining
the levy (that is, the target price less the import price) to be imposed on an imported
commodity. It is set in such a way as to bring the selling price of the commodity up
to the target price. As this price is determined at the "border crossing point," account
must be given to freight costs from this point to the area of greatest deficit in the Community, which, as noted, is the reference point for the target price. This would generally constitute the lowest possible import price of foreign products.
(4) Levy. For grains, the levies on non-Community imports are set daily according
to the cheapest world offers at Rotterdam.
. (5) Export Refunds (Restitution). This is the option open to member states to grant
a subsidy to domestic exporters so as to keep them competitive in the world market. At
maximum, it will equal the difference between the world price level and that existing in
the exporting member state.
(6) Support or Intervention Price (Prix d'intervention). This is the price at which
the national intervention agencies (backed up by the Guarantee Fund) are obligated to
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nal protection is afforded by a system of support buying at set "intervention
prices" for domestic grains coupled with subsidies for Community exports to
non-member nations. The effect of this complex and artificial market
organization is generally to prevent American grains from entering the
49
Community market at a price lower than the prevailing Community price.
It is, however, the hope of the Community that as further advances in the
area of structural reforms can be made, the CAP will be transformed into a
more economically realistic farm policy, especially with regard to foreign
imports. At present, the Community has embarked upon a systematic program for the 1970's to achieve the necessary structural modernization of
Community agricultural practice while solving the social problems of rural
areas caused by such structural reforms. 50 Whether or not the Community's
plans can overcome political resistance by Community farmers remains to be
seen; until then the protectionist nature of the CAP will continue to be a
"bate noire" for American exporters of agricultural products.
The Common Commerical Policy. A necessary corollary to the attainment of
free movement of goods throughout the Community is the institution of a
common Community commercial policy (CCP), that is, a common Community approach toward commercial relations with the outside world. 5' Accordingly, one of the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome has been the
establishment of the CCP. 52 From the point of view of the American
businessman and attorney, a basic understanding of the CCP is necessary in
order to determine the precise nature of the commercial relationships,
present and future, which will exist between the Community, its member
53
states, and the United States.
The substantive content of the CCP may be divided into autonomous and
contractual aspects. The autonomous aspect concerns such matters as internal Community measures affecting import and export policies and certain
defensive commercial measures to be taken in cases of dumping or subsidies
by non-member nations. 54 The contractual aspect pertains to the negotiation
buy up commodities offered to them. As such, this price serves as a kind of minimum

guarantee price to producers. These prices are set somewhere between 5 and 7%7 lower
than the target price-a derived price-regionalized.
(7) Unit of Account. The monetary unit used in pricing in the Community budget.

Prior to 1971 equivalent to U.S. dollar. Fluctuations in the parities between members

states' currency create severe problems in establishing a viable Community pricing

policy.
49. For further discussion of grain market organization see Dam, The European

Common Market in Agriculture, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1967).
50. See generally European Commission, Improvement of the Common Agricultural
Policy (Communication to the Council of Nov. 5, 1973), [1973] BULL. E.C. Supp. No.

17.

51. See generally Wohlfarth, The European Economic Community and World

Trade, in THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE 1 (1965)
L. Spec. Pub. No. 7).

(British Inst. of Int'l & Comp.

52. See Treaty of Rome arts. 110-16.
53. See generally Norton, Doing Business and U.S. Commercial Treaties: The Case

with the Member States of the EEC, 5 CASE WEST. REs. J. INT'L L. 4 (1972).

54. The following definitions may prove helpful: '(1) Export policy embraces such
matters as export subsidies, export credits and guarantees, export insurance, and all other

measures exercising a special effect upon exports; (2) Import policy embraces the fixing

and liberalization of quotas and measures having equivalent effects; and (3) Commercial
protective measures primarily consists of antidumping measures and the imposition of
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and conclusion of "tariff and trade" agreements by the Community with
other nations or international organizations. 55
A firm definition of the outer limits of the Community's exclusive
jurisdiction under the CCP has not been rendered to date. However, a sound
approach is that the CCP does in fact cover all measures that have a direct
influence on the international movements of goods and services to or from
the Community.5 6 In considering the Community's exclusive jurisdiction
under the CCP, the American businessman and attorney should be aware of
the developing "constitutional" theory of "parallelism." This view, which has
been tentatively received by the European Court of Justice,5 7 implies that
the Community possesses the same degree of competence to deal with the
external affairs as it possesses in internal affairs. According to this view, any
internal Community action preempts the member states from engaging
unilaterally or collectively in parallel external activities. 58 If this theory
continues to gain acceptance, the Community, at the preemption of the
member states, foreseeably will possess exclusive jurisdiction over all economic and commercial activities of the member states with the outside world.
With respect to American interests, this development would require a
significant readjustment in American foreign trade policy with Western
Europe and the renegotiation of the commercial and economic bilateral
treaties now in force with the member states of the Community. 59
B. Licensing Arrangements
For multiple business and legal reasons, licensing arrangements concerning
statutory and non-statutory industrial property rights constitute a major
avenue by which Americans may conduct business within the Community.6"
countervailing duties.
Generally on the CCP see Everling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial
Policy in the European Economic Community, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 141 (1966);
Kim, Developments in the Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community,
8 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 148 (1971); LeTallec, The Common Commercial Policy of the
EEC, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 732 (1971); Norton, The Common Commercial Policy
of the EEC: Developments in the Final Stage, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 44 (1972).
55. For example, the Community has trade agreements (inter alia) with such diverse countries as Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Argentina. The primary emphasis has been with Mediterranean countries; however, emphasis is presently
also being placed upon further trade relations in Latin America and "third world" countries generally and with Japan. For a brief discussion see EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE, COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1973).
56. See Norton, supra note 54, at 83.
57. See Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Communities, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. T 8134 (1971) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 22/70).
58. For commentary on this case see Norton, The Treaty-Making Power of the
European Economic Community-A Constitutional Crisis Facing the EEC, 7 INT'L
LAW. 589 (1973).
59. See generally Norton, The Renegotiability of United States Bilateral Commercial Treaties with the Member States of the European Economic Community, 8 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 299 (1973).

60. As indicated in Jones, Fundamentals of InternationalLicensing Agreements and
Their Application in the European Community, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 3, 4-7 (1973),
typical advantages of licensing are: inexpensive mode of penetrating a foreign market;
minimal risk (e.g., as regards foreign expropriation, labor or investment laws); simplest
manner of getting started and giving one's products exposure in a foreign country; and
certain tax advantages. See generally Semmes, Protection of Inventions and Know-How
In the Common Market, 37 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 351 (1972).
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In terms of Community law applicable to licensing arrangements, two
fundamental considerations arise: (1) the reconciliation of the national
character of the existing industrial property systems within the Community
with the broad Community objective of achieving a unified common market;
and (2) the alignment of each specific licensing arrangement with the
requirements of Community antitrust laws.
National vs. Community System. Unlike in the United States where industrial property rights are enforceable under federal law, patent and trademarks
within the Community are governed by the respective national legal systems
of the nine member states. The existence of nine separate and divergent
industrial property systems within the Community creates a considerable
possibility of varying treatment within the Community."' In addition, the
risk exists that undertakings will abuse the national systems "to maintain
territorial protection to trademark or
national frontiers by assuring absolute
'6 2
patent owners or their licensees."
The Treaty of Rome's formal attempts to balance Community interests
against potential abuses of the national industrial property systems are
obscure. The basic objectives of the Treaty call for the establishment of a
unified common market; yet, the Treaty also provides that Community law
"shall in no way prejudice the rules in member states governing the system of
property ownership."'63 Moreover, in the section of the Treaty pertaining to
the elimination of quantitative restrictions and equivalent measures with
respect to the movement of goods between member states, a specific
exception is made for restrictions based upon the national industrial and
commerical property systems. 6 4
The European Court of Justice, however, clarified the problem in the
1971 landmark case of Deutsche Grammophon 5 by abandoning the socalled "principle of territoriality" with regard to copyrights. Deutsche Grammophon, the largest producer of sound recordings in the Community,
pursuant to German retail price maintenance law had secured a relatively
high price for its phonograph records in Germany. A French subsidiary of
Deutsche Grammophon, because of a prohibition in France on retail price
maintenance, was able to distribute the same records under the same label at
a substantially lower price in France. As a result of this disparity between
prices, independent German distributors, through a variety of schemes,
began to import the lower priced French records and to sell them at a cutrate price inq Germany. Deutsche Grammophon brought suit before the
German courts to enjoin these "parallel imports" on the ground that the
61. See generally INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS (G. Pollzien & E. Langen
eds., 2d ed. 1973).
62. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 64 (1972).
63.

Compare Treaty of Rome art. 2 with id. art. 222.

64. Such an exception cannot "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between member states." See Treaty of Rome arts. 3036.
65. Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmlirkte GmbH & Co. K.G.,
10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 8106
(1971) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 78/70). For commentary on this case see Korah,
Dividing the Common Market Through National Industrial Property Rights, 35 MOD.
L. Rv. 634 (1972); 7 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 516 (1972); 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 87 (1972).
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German copyright law granted the producer of a record the exclusive right to
reproduce and distribute his product. On appeal, the question submitted to
the European Court of Justice was whether the holder of a copyright may
invoke this statutory right against parallel imports of genuine goods from
another member state within the meaning of article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome.
The main thrust of the arguments in Deutsche Grammophon centered
around the applicability of antitrust sections of the Treaty of Rome. 6
However, apparently following the submissions of the advocate-general, the
Court of Justice surprisingly based its opinion on the premise that the
German copyright law violated the "free movement of goods" articles of the
Treaty (i.e., articles 30-36). Finding that use of a copyright came within
these articles in the same manner as an "industrial and commercial property
right," the court implied that the use of the copyright by Deutsche Grammophon constituted a measure having an "equivalent effect" 67 to an quantitative restriction on the free movement of goods throughout the Community.6 8
Thus, the primary significance of the Deutsche Grammophon case for present purposes69 is that in addition to antitrust grounds, abuses of industrial
property rights may be attacked on the basis of the free movement of goods
section of the Treaty of Rome, even in instances where an attack under antitrust provisions of the Treaty may be impossible. The Court of Justice in the
recent Sterling Drug decision has removed any doubt that the principles in
Deutsche Grammophon are equally applicable to patent rights.
In a specific endeavor to facilitate a uniform approach in the area of
industrial property rights, the Community is presently discussing the adoption
of a Community Patent Treaty which would essentially create a unified
patent law throughout the Community. This law would co-exist with the
existing national patent systems, and would comprise one of the "bundle of
patents" covered by a broader European Patent Treaty to be signed by the
nine Community states and twelve other Western European nations. The
intended effect of these two European treaties is the creation within the
Community of uniform internal-market conditions for the acquisition and
exploitation of patents.7 0 The European Commission is also at work devising
71
a comparable approach in the area of trademarks. '
66. Treaty of Rome arts. 85, 86.
67. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
68. 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 657-58, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. at 7192.
69. One of the questions unanswered by the Deutsche Grammophon decision was
whether this principle would be applicable to all types of industrial and commercial
property rights. The European Commission thinks that the principle would be applicable. See FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 64, at 69. A recent decision of the European Court of Justice, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc. & Winthrop BV, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8247 (1974) (Eur.
Ct. of Justice Case No. 15/74), indicates that the Court firmly agrees with the Commission's position.
70. For a general discussion of the two treaties see Empel, European Patent Conventions, 9 COMM. MKr. L. REv. 13 (C972); Thompson, The Draft Convention for a
European Patent, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (1973). See also Commission Issues Opinion on Community Patent Convention, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9648 (1974).
71. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVrIES OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 147 (1974).
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Antitrust Considerations. Unlike the application of the free movement of
goods articles of the Treaty of Rome, the basic Community antitrust
provisions (articles 85 and 86) do not apply to the existence of industrial
and commercial property rights, but only to the exercise of those rights
pursuant to an agreement, decision or concerted practice, or to a dominant
position. 72 In a 1962 notice on patent licensing, the European Commission
indicated that it considered exclusivity in a straightforward patent licensing
agreement to be outside the purview of articles 85 and 86 so long as the
restriction rested within the "scope of the patent. ' 73 The Commission based
its opinion on the "principle of territoriality." However, in recent years the
Commission consciously has deviated from this broad exemptive position and
the Court of Justice, in the Deutsche Grammophon case, abandoned the
"principle of territoriality" as a viable doctrine. 74 The present relationship
of the Community antitrust laws to the area of industrial property rights has
been elucidated in a series of decisions rendered by the Court of Justice.
In the 1966 decision of the European Court of Justice in the GrundigConsten case 75 the supremacy of the Community antitrust provisions over
conflicting national patent statutes was affirmed. This case involved the
largest producer of tape recorders within the Community, Grundig, which sold
its products through wholesalers in Germany and through exclusive dealership arrangements in the other members states. In order to protect its French
dealer, Consten, from the import of cheaper parallel imports, Grundig
registered a second trademark in Germany in its name and in the various
other member states in the name of its respective exclusive dealers. Consten
sued the parellel importers for trademark infringement. The European Commission intervened, claiming that both the exclusive dealership agreement
between Grundig and Consten and an ancillary agreement regarding the trademark violated the provisions prohibiting restrictive trade agreements embodied
in article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. On appeal, the European Court of
Justice substantially concurred in the Commission's conclusions. Reaffirming
the supremacy of Community law over conflicting national law, the Court
made clear that the exercise of the national protection provided by industrial
property laws pursuant to an agreement cannot be used in an abusive manner
without contravening Community antitrust laws. 76
72. For a general discussion of the effect of the Community's antitrust laws upon

foreign business see text accompanying notes 100-52 infra. See generally Alexander, Industrial Property Rights and the Establishment of the European Common Market, 9
COMM. MKT. L. REv. 35 (1972); Jaume, License Agreements and the Rules of Com-

petition (CCH 1974).

For a more detailed discussion of Community antitrust laws see

text accompanying notes 99-154 infra.

73. See European Commission, Announcement on Patent License Agreements, 5

E.E.C. J.O. 2922 (1962), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 2698 (1962).
74. See generally Johannes, Patents, Trademarks & Anti-Trust in the European
Communities, in THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNTY: LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR
AMERICAN BUSINESS 169 (1973).
75. Ets. Consten S.A. and Grundig-Verkaufs G.m.b.H. v. E.E.C. Comm'n, 5 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 425, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8046 (1966)
(Eur. Ct. of Justice Case Nos. 56 & 58/64).
76. For discussion of case see Ebb, The Grundig-Consten Case Revisited: Judicial
Harmonization of National Law and Treaty Law in the Common Market, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 855 (1967); Fulda, The First Antitrust Decisions of the Commission of the
European Economic Community, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 625 (1965).
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A similar result was reached when a subsidiary sued for infringements
upon trademark rights assigned to it by its parent corporation. In the
Remington Rand7 7 case, the Italian subsidiary of Remington Rand (now
Sperry Rand) sued in Italy a parallel importer of electric razors for
trademark infringements on the basis of an assignment of trademark rights to
it from the parent corporation. The importer filed a complaint with the
Commission. The matter was settled without a formal decision by the
Commission after concessions by the Italian subsidiary were made withdrawing the Italian court suit and agreeing not to use its trademark rights to
impede parallel imports in the future. The case was significant because in
order to establish jurisdiction in this case under article 85, the Commission
devised a concept of "intra-enterprise conspiracy," whereby the assignment
of the trademark from the parent to its subsidiary was deemed an "agreement" for purposes of article 85. This concept subsequently was disavowed
by the European Court of Justice; however, the Court has achieved the same
results derived from the Commission's theory on the basis of different legal
78
approaches.
The inapplicability of the Community's antitrust provisions to the mere
ownership or exercise of patent rights was emphasized in Parke Davis & Co.
v. Probel.79 This decision resulted from an article 177 procedure (i.e.,
request for a preliminary ruling) from a Dutch tribunal. The essential issue
raised by this case was whether the holder of a Dutch patent on a certain
pharmaceutical could restrict the import of the same pharmaceutical from
Italy (where no patent protection exists for pharmaceuticals) without contravening Community antitrust laws. The Court of Justice held that the exercise
of the patent right, without more, did not constitute an agreement or concerted practice for purposes of article 85, and that the ownership of patent
rights did not necessarily determine the existence of an abuse of a dominant
position for purposes of article 86. The Court did, however, specifically
indicate that if two or more undertakings enter into an agreement concerning
the exercise of patent rights, the agreement might fall under article 85. The
Court also implied for the first time that it may invoke the Treaty of Rome
provisions on the free movement of goods in situations where there is an
apparent abuse of the exercise of patent rights. 80
81
The scope of the antitrust provisions was clarified in Sirena v. Eda.
During the 1930's and 1940's the American enterprise Mark Allen made two
separate assignments of the trademark "Prep" to Italian and German
producers of cosmetics. This suit was brought before the Italian courts by
77.

[1965-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.

9307, [1969] BULL. E.C.

No. 8, ch. V, pt. 5.
78. For further discussion see Forcione, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Antitrust Regulations of the Common Market, 25 Bus. LAw. 1419 (1970).
79. 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8054 (1968) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 24/67).
80. For further discussion of the case see Koch, Annotation on the Decision of the
Court of Justice of February 29, 1968 Re: Parke Davis & Company v. Probel and
Other, 6 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 217 (1968).
81. 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 260, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder], CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 118101 (1971) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 40/70).

1975]

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

Sirena, the Italian producer, against parallel importers of cosmetics marked
"Prep," on the grounds of trademark infringement. On the basis of article
177 of the Treaty of Rome, the Italian court submitted the question to the
European Court of Justice whether the original trademark assignment could
be considered an agreement prohibited under article 85. The court held that
article 85 was applicable "where, by virtue of trademark rights, imports of
products originating in other member states bearing the same trademark,
because the owners have acquired the trademark itself or the right to use it
through agreements with one another and third parties, are prevented." The
court distinguished the applicability of article 86, stating that the owner of a
trademark does not hold a "dominant position" in terms of article 86 "solely
by reason of the fact that he is in a position to prohibit third parties from
distributing, in the territory of a Member State, products carrying the same
mark"; rather it must also be shown that the trademark owner possesses the
power to prevent the maintenance of effective competition in a "substantial"
82
part of the relevant market in the Community.
The nature of exemptions for licensing agreements from the Community's
antitrust laws is somewhat unsettled. Inasmuch as the Commission's 1962
Notice on Patent Licensing agreement can no longer be safely relied upon
and in the absence of a "group exemption" for such agreements, careful
consideration must be given to individual exemptions conferred by the Commission. The recent decision in Re Davidson Rubber Co. 83 reflects the
Commission's present position. This case evolved around the grant throughout the Community of exclusive patent and know-how licenses relating to a
key process in the manufacture of cushions and armrests for automobiles by
Davidson Rubber, an American-controlled corporation. Each licensee
remained free to sell the products throughout the entire Community. Ancillary agreements were also entered by some licensees which tended to preserve their exclusive right within their respective national boundaries and
impede exploitation of the patent. The Commission considered parts of these
licensing arrangements to be violative of article 85(1) because within each
given market situation they had as their object and effect a perceptible
restriction of competition within the Community. Before granting a discretionary exemption under article 85(3), the Commission required that the
agreements' non-attack clause be deleted and a contractual stipulation be
inserted eliminating any export restraints affecting trade between the member
states. The Commission did find that certain non-exclusive cross-licensing
provisions relating to improvements, which required the prior consent of the
82. For further discussion see Ladas, Assignment of Trademarks and Antitrust Law
-The Sirena Case of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 62 TRADEMARK

R. 566 (1972).
83. 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52, [1970-1972 New Developments Transfer Binder]
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9512 (1972) (Commission decision of June 9, 1972). For
other recent significant Commission decisions see Re Burrough-Delphanque and Burroughs-Geha-Wcrke, 11 COMM. MKT. L.R. D67, D72, [1970-1972 New Developments
Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9485, 9486 (1972) (Commission decisions
of Dec. 22, 1971); Re A. Raymond & Co., 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45, [1970-1972 New
Developments Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9513 (1972) (Commission
Decision of June 9, 1972).
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licensor, and the arbitration clauses to be outside the scope of article 85.84
One commentator has suggested that the following types of specific
licensing provisions in light of existing Community laws and practice would
be violative of Community antitrust law:8 5 (1) restrictions in area and in
,time, such as absolute territorial exclusivity of the license, a ban on exports
which would affect trade between the member states, or an agreement for a
duration longer than the life of the industrial property right; (2) limitations
on the licensee's right to compete with his licensor or to challenge the validity
of the licensor's property right, as through non-attack, non-competition, or
grant-back clauses; and (3) typing arrangements which are not indispensable
for a technically proper exploitation of the patent.
Observations. In assessing the development of Community law with respect
to licensing arrangements, the American businessman and attorney must be
aware of the general implications of the supremacy of Community law and
principles over conflicting aspects of the industrial national property systems.
Not only must the licensing arrangements be consistent with a uniform
application of Community antitrust laws, but the exercise of industrial
property rights (even absent a specific arrangement or agreement) must be
compatible with the requirements of the Treaty of Rome regarding the
establishment of a common market and the free movement of goods
throughout the Community. In addition, specific attention must be given to
the expansion of Community jurisprudence in the area of industrial property
rights through the decisions of the European Court of Justice and Commission and to the developments in the final drafting of the Community Patent
Treaty.
C. Right of Establishment and Supply of Services
Establishment. The term "establishment" under the Treaty of Rome is a
broad and flexible concept, generally providing for the right of Community
nationals and undertakings (except non-profit undertakings) to enjoy national treatment within the member states of the Community concerning all
matters of economic self-employment.8 6 In determining the beneficiaries of
the right of establishment, the Treaty of Rome makes no distinction between
individuals or companies or firms. By the terms of article 58 of the Treaty, to
enjoy the right of establishment a company or firm must be formed in
accordance with the laws of the member states, and must have a registered
office, central administration or principal place of business within the
community. The right of establishment is not, however, absolute. All that is
84. For further discussion of this case and other recent cases see generally, Allen,
The Present Status of Exclusive Patent Licensing Agreements in Relation to the Rules
of Competition of the EEC, as Indicated by Four Recent Decisions of the EEC Commission, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 81 (1974).
85. See Loyrette, Licensing Problems in Relation to EEC Laws, Rules and Regulations, in SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD (1974). See generally C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 217-28 (1973).
86. See generally Treaty of Rome arts. 52-58; cf. Convention of Establishment with
France, Nov. 25, 1959, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625 (effective Dec. 8,

1960).
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guaranteed is national treatment for individuals and undertakings within a
87
member state.
Essentially, "freedom of establishment" as envisioned by the Treaty of
Rome has two fundamental components: freedom of nondiscriminatory
access to and exercise of non-salaried activities; and freedom to organize and
manage undertakings without discrimination.8" The technical implementation of this freedom, as with the freedom to supply services, is accomplished
-through directives promulgated by the Council of Ministers.89
Although the right of establishment has not been fully implemented to
date, the Council has issued approximately forty directives abolishing restrictions with regard to the right of establishment and freedom to supply
services. 90 Moreover, a recent decision of the Court of Justice indicates that
even in the absence of implementing directives, article 52 of the Treaty of
Rome, which ensures freedom of establishment, is directly applicable within
the member states as of January 1, 1970, the end of the transitional
period. 91
To understand the right of establishment, one must distinguish between
what conceptually can be termed "initial establishment" and "secondary
establishment." Initial establishment pertains to the initial economic entry
into an EEC member state. Secondary establishment refers to the subsequent
entry of an "initially established" individual or undertaking into another
member state (e.g., by way of a branch office or subsidiary). The Treaty of
Rome's provision on the right of establishment is generally pertinent to
secondary establishment. Thus, a member state may set whatever restrictions
it deems necessary with regard to the initial entry of a non-EEC individual
or undertaking. It, however, can apply restrictions with regard to individuals
or undertakings "established" within the Community only to the extent that
92
such restrictions are equally applicable to its own nationals.
Two hypotheticals may be useful in understanding the problems an
American firm may encounter under this concept of secondary establishment
(i.e., assuming initial "establishment" within the EEC is gained). First,
consider the case of an American firm incorporated under the laws of the
United Kingdom and having its registered office there. This enterprise then
wishes to set up in France, claiming that it is a Community enterprise and
87. On freedom of establishment see generally U. EvERuLrN,
LISHMENT IN THE COMMON MARKET

(1964); B.

GOLDMAN,
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LAw 26-135 (1973); 3 MGRET 87-173.
88. See Norton, The Renegotiability of United States Bilateral Commercial Treaties
with the Member States of the European Community, 8 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 299, 332
(1973).
89. See Treaty of Rome arts. 54(2), (3); Programme general pour la suppression
des restrictionsa la liberti d'establessement, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 36 (1962) [for English translation see 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1335 (1962)].
90. See generally Maestripieri, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom To Supply
Services, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 150 (1973).
91. See Reyners v. Belgian State, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 305 (1974) (Eur. Ct. of
Justice Case No. 2/74). For consideration of impact of this case see Commission
Communication, Doc. SEC(74)4024 final (Oct. 30, 1974), at 2 CCH Comm. MKT.
REP.

9722 (1975).

92. See Lang, The Right of Establishment of Companies and Free Movement of
Capitalin the European Economic Community, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 684, 691.
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accordingly a beneficiary of the right of establishment. By an initial reading
of article 58 of the Treaty of Rome, such a corporate move would appear
permissible. However, article 58 confers upon companies only those rights
which are available to individuals. This automatically refers the reader back
to article 52 of the Treaty, which speaks of "setting up of agencies, branches
or subsidiaries by nationals of any member state established in the territory
of any member state." Thus, the American-controlled British company, in
addition to the requirements of article 58, must be "established within the
territory of any member states." The Council of Ministers has defined the
term "established" to mean "having business activity (which shows) a
continuous and effective link with the economy of the member state or of an
overseas country or territory. '93 Accordingly, our British firm not only must
have a registered office within the Community but also must have a
"continuous and effective" economic link with the Community. There must
94
be both a genuine legal and economic tie to the Community.
A more difficult hypothetical concerns an American firm acquiring direct
or indirect control over a genuinely "established" Community enterprise.
According to the French view, any foreign "controlled" undertaking, even
those which are incorporated and have extensive business activities in the
EEC, would be denied access to the right of establishment under the Treaty
of Rome. 95 While requirements of EEC law are contrary to the French
position equating "control" with "establishment," the political questions and
implications raised by this position are very serious and may possibly
precipitate a change in Community law.96
Services. The Treaty of Rome requires that the "freedom to supply services"
is to be fully achieved by the end of the transitional period. The concept of
"'services" as used in the Treaty of Rome is distinct from the general economic
understanding of the term. Essentially, "services" under the Treaty of Rome
denotes a residual category of economic activity covering those economic
activities not expressly dealt with by the Treaty's provisions on the freedom
of movement of goods, persons, and capital. 97 These services must be performed by a national or a company "established" in a community country
other than that of the person for whom the service is intended (i.e., there
must be "cross-frontier" activity). In addition, the services must be of a
kind normally provided for value, that is, economic services. "Services"
specifically include those services provided by industrial or commercial
businesses in small craft industries and the professions. Although technical
implementation of this freedom has not been achieved to date, it does appear
that articles 59-66 have become fully self-executing as of the end of the
transitional period. 98
93. See Progrfzm general,supra note 89, tit. I(d).

94. Id.
95. See Loussouarn, La condition des personnes morales en droit internationalprivg,
96 RECUEIL DES COURS 447, 489 (1959).
96. See Torem & Craig, Developments in the Control of Foreign Investment in
France, 70 MICH. L. REV. 285, 305-06 (1971).
97. See Treaty of Rome arts. 59-66.
98. See generally Programme general pour la suppression des restrictions a la
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III.

ANTITRUST LAWS

Community antitrust laws form the basic antitrust regulations in Western
Europe. 99 The source of legal authority for the Community to deal with
antitrust matters stems directly from the Treaty of Rome, which contains a
special section on the rules of competition to be applied throughout the
Community. 100 Such rules are to be directly applicable within the member
states (i.e., fully self-executing). 10 1 However, Community antitrust laws and
regulations do not preclude the continuing existence of national antitrust
laws; rather the national authorities may act when the Community has not
asserted its authority or when the national rules serve objectives different
from those of the Community. But Community antitrust laws and regulations
are supreme: Community law requires that "conflicts between Community
rules and national rules . . . should be resolved by applying the principle
u0 2
of the primacy of the Community rule.'
presentation des services, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 32 (1962) [for English Translation see 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 331 (1962)].
99. For a discussion of how these antitrust provisions affect licensing agreements
and industrial property rights, see text accompanying notes 74-98 supra. See generally
W. ALEXANDER, EEC RULES OF COMPETITION (1973); C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (1973); J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW
OF THE EEC, A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1973); A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1968); EEC COMMISSION, PRACTICAL GUIDE OF THE
COMMISSION, ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE EEC TREATY AND RELEVANT REGULATIONS;
A MANUAL FOR FIRMS (1962); 4 MF2GRET; C. OBERDORFER, A. GLEISCH & M. HIRSCH,

COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW (2d ed. 1971).
100. Treaty of Rome arts. 85-94. Briefly, art. 85 pertains to restrictive trade practices; art. 86 to abuses of a dominant position; arts. 87-89 to the implementation of arts.
85 and 86; art. 90 to rules concerning public enterprises; art. 91 to transitional antidumping rules; and arts. 92-94 to rules on state aids. While the drafters of Community
antitrust laws were undoubtedly astute students of the American antitrust laws, a flippant
comparison of Community antitrust laws with their American counterparts is fraught
with dangers. Historical and economic conditions which gave rise to the Community
laws are wholly different from those which gave birth to the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
The Community in its formation was faced with two major dilemmas: (1) the attainment of the capacity to achieve economies of a scale conducive to European industrial
and commercial growth; and (2) the amalgamation of the separate economies of the
member states, that is, the creation of a single economic market. Accordingly, Community law and practice has shown no built-in reflex against size or against large "European" business combinations (cartels). Quite the contrary, Community practice has actively encouraged mergers and combinations of genuinely "European" firms, which are
conducive to overall European economic growth. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF NEW YORK, BUSINESS REGU-

LATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS (1969-70) (4 vols.); Jones, American Antitrust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative Perspective, 90 LAw Q. REV. (1974);
Timberg, Antitrust in the Common Market: Innovation and Surprise, 37 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1972).
101. On the concept of direct applicability of Community laws see Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law; the Development of a Community Concept,
1970 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 257; Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect-Two
Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 CoMM. MKT. L. REV. 425
(1972).
Also, the European Commission has been in practice most aggressive in expanding
and enforcing its antitrust powers. Treaty of Rome art. 3(f). For discussion of economic objectives behind Community antitrust policy, see D. McLACHLAN & D. SWANN,
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(1967); D.

SWANN &

D.

LEES,

ANTITRUST POLICY IN EUROPE (1973). For consideration of Commission's activity in
the antitrust area see generally COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SECOND
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1973).

102. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100, 119, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. I 8056, at 7866 (1969) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case
No. 14/68).
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The key articles of the Treaty of Rome dealing with antitrust matters are
articles 85 and 86. With the exception of those special Community rules
concerning agriculture and transportation, these articles are generally applicable to all sectors of the Community economy, private or public.' 03 To
date, article 85 has been construed as applying exclusively to restrictive trade
practices and article 86 has been used to attack abuse of "dominant
positions." However, these provisions are not mutually exclusive since an
abuse of a dominant position can be achieved through activities also violative
of article 85(l).104
A.

Article 85 and Restrictive Trade Practices

Article 85(1). Paragraph 1 of article 85 prohibits "all agreements between

undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the Common Market . . . ." For purposes of article 85 the term "trade"
includes movement of both good and services. 10 5
103. For special rules concerning agriculture see Council Regulation 26/62, 5
E.E.C. J.O. 993 (1962), as amended by Council Regulation No. 49/62, 5 E.E.C. J.O.
1571 (1962). For rules regarding transportation see Council Regulation No. 1017/68,
11 E.E.C. J.O. L175, at 1 (1968).
104. See generally Graupner, An Outline of the Law of Restrictive Practices in the
European Economic Community, 1972 JupmICAL REV. 248; Mestmacher, Concentration
and Competition in the EEC (pt. I), 6 J. WORLD TAD E L. 615 (1972), (pt. II), 7 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 36 (1973).
105. Article 85(1) also contains certain illustrative, but not exhaustive, examples of
particular restrictive trade activities which would be incompatible with the establishment
of a common market, if the general requirements of art. 85( 1 ) are met:
(a) Activities directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions. Both horizontal and vertical agreements are covered and both the direct
and indirect effects of such agreements are considered in determining a violation. Price
information exchange agreements, while not directly constituting price-fixing, may lead
to such restrictive conditions or indicate a concerted practice producing such restrictive
acts. In addition, collective resale price maintenance agreements which have an intercommunity effect fall within art. 85(1). Also, agreements which do not directly obligate parties to a fixed price but set certain penalties if a recommended price is undercut,
would generally be violative agreements.
(b) Activities limiting or controlling production, markets, technical development, or
investment. This subparagraph is particularly broad in scope. As a general rule, any
agreement, decision, or concerted practice which divides or is apt to divide markets
within the Community, particularly if along national lines, will be violative of art.
85(l). Also activities ancillary to such market divisions would be condemned under art.
85. Of particular concern are specialization agreements and joint ventures in research
and development which are covered by this subparagraph. In many cases, however,
where the beneficial effects of such activities are significant, a specific or group exemption can be found under art. 85(3).
(c) Activities sharing markets or sources of supplies. Of particular interest here are
exclusive distributorship agreements. Since early in the development of the Community
antitrust laws, the Commission has been favorably disposed toward such agreements.
However, if an exclusive dealership agreement provides for exclusive territorial protection, it will generally be prohibited under art. 85, because it tends to lead to divisions
of markets and the impairment of the establishment of a common market. In addition,
most forms of collective exclusive distributorship agreements run afoul of art. 85. Collective rebate agreements, which have an effect equivalent to collective exclusive distributorship agreements, may be treated in a similar manner for purposes of art. 85(1).
(d) Activities applying dissimilar conditions to the equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. There is a paucity
of Community jurisprudence on the problem of discrimination in equivalent transactions.
Certain commentators feel that art. 85(1) will not apply to such situations absent the
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Notion of Undertaking. For purposes of article 85(1) the term "undertaking" is used in an economic context, and refers to any economic unit. 10 6 As
viewed by one legal commentator, "undertaking" embraces in principle all
economic activities by individuals as well as corporations regardless of their
legal form.' 0 7 Applying this principle to the relationship of parent companies
and their subsidiaries, the European Court of Justice and Commission treat
this relationship not so much from a legal standpoint as from an economic
one and confer upon it the status of a single undertaking. However, the
special treatment of parent and subsidiary has a two-edged effect. A genuine
parent-subsidiary relationship will preclude the application of article 85(1)
to the intracorporate activities of the two corporations, but at the same time
it may render the parent responsible for the anti-competitive activities of its
subsidiary. 108
Concerted Practices. The notion of concerted practices (as distinguished
from formal agreements between undertakings or formal decisions of associations of undertakings) is largely inspired by American antitrust legislation,
and refers to an informal combination between undertakings which knowingly substitute a practical cooperation for an actual agreement to distort
competiton.' 0 9 Accordingly, concerted practices are not necessarily conspiracy embodied in a formal agreement and may result merely from a coordination of activity which becomes apparent from the behavior of the participants. In this respect, parallel behavior, which by itself is not necessarily
equivalent to a concerted practice, may constitute a strong indication of the
existence of a concerted practice when it creates competitive conditions
which do not correspond to normal market conditions. 1 0
Apt To Affect Trade Between Member States. Article 85(1) is only
applicable to restrictive trade agreements and practices "which may affect
trade between the member states."
The European Court of Justice
presence of a dominant position by the undertaking so discriminating; but, this view has
not been accepted by the European Commission. C. BELLAMY & G. CHILDS, COMMON

75-76 (1973). While activities which discriminate in
equivalent transactions on the basis of nationality are prohibited, it does not appear that
nationality is the determinative criterion under this subparagraph.
MARKET LAw OF COMPETITION

(e) Activities making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial

usage, have no connection with the subject of such agreements. Arguments have been
made that this subparagraph pertains only to activities between two parties in imposing
tying arrangements on third parties. Such a narrow view appears to find no basis under

the wording of this paragraph nor under Community jurisprudence or practice.
106. No equivalent legal term can be found either in the Treaty of Rome or in any
of the general laws of the member states of the Community. See R. GRAUPNER, THE
11 (1965).
107. Thiesing, Antitrust Rules of the European Community Under Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome, in THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR
AMERICAN BUSINESS 55, 66 (1973).
RULES OF COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

108.
Ltd. v.
COMM.
Kodak,
mission

For an indication of the Court of Justice's approach see Imperial Chem. Indus.,
E.C. Comm'n, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D19, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
MKT. REP. %8161 (1972) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 48/69). See also Re
9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D19, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2412.39 (1970) (Comdecision); Re Christian & Nielsen, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D36, 1 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. M2412.26 (1969) (Commission decision).
For commentary see 6 TEXAS
INT'L L.F. 148 (1970).
109. A. NEALE, THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 32 (2d ed. 1970).
110. See generally Korah, Concerted Practices,36 MOD. L. REv. 220 (1973).
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deems trade between member states to be affected whenever the restrictive
practice may impair, directly or indirectly, potentially or actually, the
realization of a unified Common Market."' Paradoxically, a practice may
increase trade between member states, yet also be deemed a restrictive
agreement because the actual or potential effect upon trade between the
member states does not necessarily have to be prima facie an adverse
one."12
Object or Elfect. To come within the purview of article 85(1), the
agreement, decision or concerted practice must have as its object or effect
either the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the
Common Market. Concerning this question of object or effect, the European
Court of Justice has stated that "for the purpose of applying Article 85(1), it
is superfluous to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it
appears that it has the object of restricting, preventing or distorting competition.'U18

In an effort to provide some practical guidelines consistent with decisions
of the European Court of Justice, the European Commission has formulated
a de minimis rule by which restrictive trade practices having only insignificant effects within the Community are considered outside the umbrella of
article 85(1). The Commission guidelines are essentially quantitative ones;
however, they are based also upon the notion that the activities of the parties
concerned will be outside article 85 if such parties have a weak position 14in
the market and cannot restrain competition in any "perceptible" manner.
Negative Clearanceand Notification. Pursuant to the Council of Ministers
regulation 17, the basic implementing antitrust regulation of the Community, provision is made for obtaining a negative clearance, a procedure similar
to seeking a no-action letter from the Federal Securities and Exchange
Commission. 1 5 Essentially a negative clearance is a statement by the
European Commission that on the basis of the information available at the
time of its decision, there are no grounds for intervening against the desired
agreement, decision or concerted practice. While the negative clearance
furnishes a certain degree of comfort to the enterprises involved in a
questionable agreement, decision, or practice, its security is actually illusory;
it is not binding upon the municipal courts of the member states and may be
revised or rescinded by the Commission upon the discovery of facts unknown
to the Commission at the time of its decision or upon a change in Communi111. See S.A. Cadillon v. Firma Hdss Maschinenbau K.G., 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R.

8135, at 7539 (1971)
420, 428, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
(Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 1/71).
112. See, e.g., Consten & Grundig v. EEC Comm'n, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8046 (196'6) (Eur. Ct. of Justice

Case Nos. 56 & 58/64).
113. Id. at 473.

Y

114. See E.C. Commission, Notice Concerning Agreements of Minor Importance, 13

E.E.C. J.O. L64, at 1 (1970), 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D15 (1970); cf. Volk v. Eto J. Vervaeke, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 273, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8074 (1969) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 5/169).
115. See EEC Council of Ministers Regulation 17/62, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 13/204 (1962).
See also Regulation 27/62, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 35/1118 (1962) (concerning the form, content, and other details regarding applications and notifications). A negative clearance
is available under both arts. 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
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ty jurisprudence. Because of a monumental backlog of applications for
negative clearance, the Commission generally will act only upon requests
involving sizable undertakings, typifying a broad class of agreements, decisions, or concertive practices, or concerning matters which the Commission
feels are topically significant." 6
Application for negative clearance is made on form A/B"17 which
provides both application for negative clearance under article 85(1) and for
notification for purposes of an exemption under article 85(3). Confusion
often arises as to the significance of the negative clearance as compared with
that of notification. Negative clearance and notification are two distinct
concepts and procedures. Negative clearance is a qualified statement of the
Commission that in its view (as based on existing and known circumstances)
article 85(1) is not applicable to the particular agreement, decision, or practice at issue. Notification forms the procedural prerequisite for an exemption under article 85(3) and presupposes a contravention of article 85(1).
Thus, if an application for a negative clearance fails, or if in the future an
agreement is considered violative of article 85(1) and an undertaking has
made notification of the agreement for purposes of article 85(3), then it may
subsequently request an exemption under this section of the Treaty of
Rome. 118
Inasmuch as an undertaking cannot apply for an article 85(3) exemption
until such time as it has notified, it is advisable to apply for a negative
clearance and to notify at the same time. In addition, an undertaking will not
be subject to Community fines from the date of notification until such time
as the agreement, decision, or practice is subsequently determined violative
of article 85.11 9
Article 85(2). By the terms of article 85(2) any agreement, decision, or
concerted practice violative of article 85(1) shall be automatically void. No
prior decision of the Commission or Court of Justice is required for an
agreement to be prohibited; such agreement shall be considered null and
void ab initio. Accordingly, article 85(2) not only subjects violative agreements, decisions, or practices to Commission proceedings under regulation 17,
but it also renders their contractual aspects legally unenforceable before the
20
municipal courts of the member states.'
116. See M. SASSEN, ENSURING FAIR COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 4
(1970). For a list of negative clearances issued by the Commission see COMMISSION
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 205-12 (1972);
COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

SECOND REPORT

ON COMPETITION

POLICY

175-76 (1973).
117. For a copy of the form A/B see 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2659 (1971).
118. See Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, art. 4(l). For a recent example of an
art. 85(3) exemption see Re Davidson Rubber Co., 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52, [19701972 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9512 (1972) (EEC Decision No.
72/337).
119. See Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, art. 4(1). For a recent example of imposition of a fine by the Commission see Re Pittsburgh Coming Europe-Formica Belgium-Hertel, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D2 (1972), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2542.683
(1973).
120. See generally Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, art. 1. See, e.g., Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export S.A., II Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. If 8149 (1971) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 22/71).
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Prior to the recent decision of the European Court of Justice in Brasserie
deHaecht v. Wilken & Janssen (No. 2),121 various legal commentators
inferred from a series of court decisions that agreements which were duly
"notified" for purposes of article 85(3) were granted a "provisional validity"
from the date of notification until they were finally determined to be
violative of article 85.122 However, Brasserie deHaecht (No. 2) made clear
that all agreements, decisions, or practices ultimately found to be violative of
article 85 and which became operative after the date regulation 17 became
effective 123 do not enjoy "provisional validity." Accordingly, offending agreements, decisions, or practices, even though duly notified, will be held null
and void ab initio, and the parties entering into such agreements, decisions,
or practices do so at their own peril. Agreements in effect prior to the
enactment of regulation 17 and duly notified in accordance with article 4 of
that regulation come within the doctrine of "provisional validity"; however,
such old agreements would perhaps be secure for all practical purposes from
1 24
Commission action because of statute of limitations problems.
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice indicates that the nullifying effect of article 85(2) is applicable only to those aspects and provisions
of the agreement, decision, or practice which are found to be violative of
article 85(1) and not to the entire agreement, decision, or practice, provided
that the offensive aspects can be severed from the whole. If a severance of
this kind cannot be accomplished without destroying the substantive provisions of the arrangement, then the entire agreement, decision, or practice is
null and void.12 5 The determination of which aspects or provisions are in
fact severable is not within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice,
126
but rather must be made by the municipal courts of the member states.
Article 85(3). While activities contravening article 85(1) are considered
null and void ab initio, the Treaty of Rome under article 85(3) provides a
basis by which violative activities may be granted a specific exemption from
article 85. Essentially, article 85(3) is complementary to article 85(1) and
provides a balancing test whereby if the beneficial effects of the questioned
121. 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 287, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 8170 (19731) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 48/72).
122. Cf. Brauerei A. Bilger S6hne GmbH v. Jehle, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 382, [19671970 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8076 (1971) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case
No. 43/69).
123. This regulation became effective March 13, 1962.
124. See generally Vogelaar & Guy, The Second Brasserie de Haecht (Brasserie de
Haecht v. Wilken-Ienssen Case 43/72 (1973) (CMLR 287)) Case; A Delphic Oracle,
22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 648 (1973); Wertheimer, The Haecht If Judgment and Its Repercussions, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 386 (1973). Concerning the matter of limitations, see Draft Regulation of the E.C. Council on Limitations of Actions, 11 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. D40 (1972).
125. See La Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
357, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047 (1966) (Eur. Ct. of
Justice Case No. 56/65).
126. Id. at 376, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 7696-97.
As stated in one recent article: "[I]n drafting contracts, care should be taken to isolate,
to the extent possible, those clauses which may be prohibited by Article 85(1) in order
to permit the doctrine of severance to operate effectively and without restraint." Alef,
European Communities: The Effect of EEC Antitrust Laws on Companies Doing Business in the Common Market, 1973 TAx MANAGEMENT INT'L J. No. 2, at 7, 9.
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activity outweigh the detrimental effects then an exemption may be granted
by the European Commission in its sole discretion. 127 Effects considered beneficial by the Commission are the improvement in production or distribution
of goods and the promotion of technical or economic progress within the
Common Market, allowing at the same time a fair share of resulting benefits
for the consumer. Effects considered detrimental by the Comission are
the imposition of restrictions on the achievement of the above beneficial
effects and the actual or potential128elimination of competition in a substantial
portion of the products involved.
Exemptions pursuant to 'article 85(3) may ,be granted by the Commission
in individual cases or for whole categories of restrictive agreements (the socalled "group" or "block" exemptions), but only for a limited time and only
under certain conditions.' 29 Group exemptions are measures of general
applicability, and accordingly one must be extremely careful in fitting an
individual case within the general exemption. To date there are group
exemptions for specialization agreements 13 0 and exclusive dealership agreements, 13 and group exemptions on patent licensing agreements and norms
and types are expected to be promulgated by the Council of Ministers in the
near future.' 3 2 In addition the Commission, from time to time, has issued
notices setting forth the current position of the Commission with regard to
certain types of restrictive practices. 13 3 These notices have no binding legal
127. See R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTrrRusT LAW 115-16 (1967); Schumacher, The System of Enforcement: The European Economic Community, 1963 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. Supp. No. 6, at 65; cf. Zapheriou, Rule of Reason and Double Jeopardy
in European Antitrust Laws, 6 TEXAs INT'L L.F. 1, 6 (1970). Notification by form A/B
(see note 117 supra and accompanying text) is the basic procedural prerequisite for applying for an exemption under art. 85(3) and the European Commission.
128. Treaty of Rome art. 85(3), reads as follows:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
129. On specific exemptions see Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, arts. 8, 9. On
block exemptions see Council of Ministers Regulation 19/65, 8 E.E.C. J.O. 36/533
(1965) (concerning application of art. 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements
and concerted practices).
130. See Council of Ministers Regulation 2779/72, 15 E.E.C. J.O. L292/23 (1972).
131. See Council of Ministers Regulation 67/67, 10 E.E.C. J.O. 57/849 (1967), as
amended, Regulation 259/72, 15 E.E.C. J.O. (1972).
132. For bases of the Council's power to enact block exemption on patent licensing
agreements types see Regulation 19/65, supra note 129, art. 1. For norms and types
of block exemptions see Regulation 2821/71, 14 E.E.C. J.O. 285/46 (1971) (also permitting a block exemption on research and development agreements).
133. See, e.g., Notice Concerning Exclusive Agency Contracts Made With Commer2697 (1962); Notice
cial Agents, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 2921, 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP.
Concerning Patent Licensing Agreements, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 2922, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
26918 (1962); Notice Concerning Cooperation Agreements Between Small and Me2699
dium-Sized Enterprises, 11 E.E.C. J.O. C75/3, 1 CCH COMM. MKiT. REP.
(1968); Notice Concerning Agreements of Minor Importance, 14 E.E.C. J.O. C64/1,
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2700 (1971).
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effect upon any of the Community institutions or upon any municipal
court; however, they are indicative of the limits the Commission presently
places upon the scope of article 85(1).
B.

Article 86 and Draft Statute on Mergers

Article 86. Article 86 specifically prohibits any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a
substantial part of it. Unlike under article 85, activities violative of article 86
are absolutely null and void without exception. Up until the past several
years, article 86 remained a dormant article; however, since that time there
has developed considerable Community jurisprudence on this article and its
34
application to dominant positions..
Dominant Position. The Treaty of Rome and the various regulations
issued thereunder are silent as to what constitutes a dominant position; any
definition must be abstracted from the decisions of the European Court of
Justice and the European Commission. Clearly a dominant position is
something less than an outright monopoly; yet, it also appears clear that it
must be more than an oligopoly. The Court of Justice has given the following
view of what may constitute a dominant position in one instance:
Since according to [article 86] the dominant position must at least extend to a 'substantial part' of the Common Market it is necessary . . .
that the manufacturer, alone or together with other undertakings belonging to the same ,group, is in a position to prevent effective competition in a considerable part of the market in question; in this respect, the
possible existence, in particular, of manufacturers who market products
of the same kind and the position
in the market of these manufacturers
35
must be taken into account.'
Dominant Position Must Be Within Substantial Part of Community. "A
substantial part" of the Common Market is not easily defined. From
134. Treaty of Rome art. 86 reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;

(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
See generally Korah, The Control of Mergers Under Article 86 of the Rome Treaty,
26 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 82 (1973). For comparative treatment of art. 86 with

American antitrust laws, see R.

JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT PO-

SmON, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACH TO THE
CONTROL OF ECONOMIC POWER (1970).

135. Deutsche-Grammophon Gesellschaft GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte-GmbH
& Co. K.G., 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631, 658, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. 8106, at 7192 (1971) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 78/70).
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Community jurisprudence the German market alone or a part of the German
market may constitute a substantial part of the Common Market for
purposes of article 86.136 The Belgian, British, French, and Italian markets
by themselves would also seem to satisfy this test. The borderline situations
generally involve the smaller member states' markets (e.g., Ireland or
part of (but not the entire) market of one of
Luxembourg) or a substantial
87
states.'
member
the larger
Improper Exploitation or Abuse of Dominant Position. Mere size and a
concomitant dominant position within the Community antitrust system is not
per se violative of article 86. A violation of article 86 is caused by the abuse
or improper exploitation of a dominant position. One working definition of
an abuse of a dominant position is the use of such position "to act in an
unreasonable way which, in conditions of effective competition, would be
unlikely to be permitted by suppliers or customers or would not be practical
in view of likely action by competitors."' 8 8
Effect upon Trade Between Member States. To be violative of article 86
the abuse of the dominant position must be apt to affect trade between member states. This requirement is analogous to that contained in article 85(1),
and no sound basis appears to exist for distinguishing the substantive content
of one from the other.'8 9 For practical purposes any abuse of a dominant
40
position will generally tend to affect trade between the member states.1
Draft Merger Regulation. After several years of gestation a Draft Regulation
of the Control of Concentrations was issued by the European Commission on
July 18, 1973.141 Unlike regulation 17, the draft merger regulation will not
be an implementing regulation but will expand substantively the scope of
article 86. Although the Commission has taken the firm position that the
Council of Ministers has power to enact such a merger regulation, it is not
clear whether the Council of Ministers possesses such power without a formal
amendment of the Treaty of Rome. An early adoption of the draft regula42
tion by the Council is unlikely.'
For purposes of the draft merger regulation, the term "concentration"
(and not merger) is used in order to cover a broad area of economic control,
including all forms of horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate concentrations.
Essentially, if a concentration confers the power to "hinder effective competition" within the Common Market, it will be deemed incompatible with the
136. See, e.g., Re The European Sugar Cartel, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D65, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 9570 (1973).
137. For discussion see Johannes, Control of Abuse of a Dominant Position Under
Article 86, in THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR AMERIcAN BUSINESS 159, 160-61 (1973).
138. C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 156 (1973).
139. See text accompanying notes 105, 111-12 supra.
140. Cf. Gema v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 694 (1972) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case No. 45/71).
141. The Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation
(EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT.REP.

9586 (1973).

142. For discussion of Draft Merger Regulation see Johannes, Antitrust in the EEC
in 1974, in SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD (1974); Kyros, Common
Market Merger Policy: Sources and Development, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 518 (1974).
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Community's antitrust system. Concentrations having a combined annual
sales revenue of less than 200 million units of accounts (one u.a. = $1.46),
and which cumulatively occupy not more than twenty-five percent of the
relevant market in any member state, will be exempt from the provisions of
143
the draft merger regulation.
In addition to being subject to the substantive provisions of the regulation,
concentrations involving undertakings with an aggregate annual turnover of
one billion units of account will be subject to prior notification with the
Commission: special notification provisions exist for banks, insurance companies, and financial institutions.' 4 4 Once notification is filed, the Commission has three months to halt the merger, with this period subject to
extension if the information supplied with the notification is deemed incomplete. If the Commission does not commence proceedings before the end of
the three-month period, it may be presumed that the
notified concentration is
145
compatible with the Community's antitrust system.
C. ExtraterritorialApplicability of Antitrust Laws
Of particular concern for the American enterprise is the Community's
approach toward the extraterritorial applicability of its antitrust laws. As
derived from both articles 85 and 86, the European Commission may apply
the antitrust laws to any anti-competitive situation whch has an effect within
the Common Market. Accordingly, an enterprise may be subject to EEC
antitrust regulations even if not domiciled within the Community or directly
doing business there. This broad extension of the subject matter jurisdiction
of the Community, analogous to the outreach of American commercial
law, 1 46 dramatically increases the exposure to potential liability for American multinational firms.
The decision of the European Court of Justice concerning Imperial
Chemical Industries of Great Britain illustrates the impact of the extraterritorial applicability of EEC antitrust laws. 1 47 One of the core questions in this
case was the extent of the Commission's authority to fine a non-Community
enterprise for alleged violations of Community antitrust law. ICI, which at
the time of the suit was a non-Community enterprise, had been fined in
1969, along with nine other dye stuff manufacturers, pursuant to article
85(1), for price fixing. ICI challenged the Community's jurisdiction to
impose such fines merely because of the effects produced in the Community,
by acts it may have committed outside the Community. ICI further asserted
143. Draft Merger Regulation, supra note 141, art. 1.
144. Id. art. 4.
145. Id. art. 6.
146. Regarding antitrust matters, cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Inc., 1963 CCH TRADE CAS. 70,600, at 77.415. Regarding securities matters,
cf. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
147. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D19, [19711973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8161 (1972) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case
No. 48/69). For a comtarative discussion by Advocate-General Mayras see 11 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 537, 593-608 (1972).

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

1975]

that the acts in question, which may have been committed within the Community, were those of its subsidiary within the Community and not that of the
parent company. In rejecting these arguments, the Court of Justice considered the acts of the subsidiary to be the acts of the parent because the
subsidiary was not shown to be autonomous in determining its course of
action on the market. The Court proceeded to uphold the Commission's
fine inasmuch as the concerted practice in question manifested itself within
the EEC. The determining factor was smply that the acts in question had
148
an effect within the Community.
Since the ICI opinion, two decisions of the Court of Justice (involving
American Commercial Solvent Corporation and Continental Can of New
York, respectively) have again espoused the "effects" concept of extraterritorial applicability of Community antitrust laws and are of particular concern
to the American enterprise doing business in the Community. 1 49 Whether or
not the "effects" doctrine will be used to control the activities of nonCommunity multinationals remains to be seen. Certainly, on a political level,
the various member states of the Community are very concerned about the
entire problem of foreign multinationals doing business within the Community; 150 but, as yet, no firm indication exists, in terms of Community law
and practice, that article 86 (or article 85) will be used to bolster the
political stance of any Community member state. 1 51
D.

Enforcement Powers of European Commission

The procedure for enforcing Community antitrust laws, as set forth in
regulation 17, is essentially an administrative process wherein the European
Commission' 5 2 possesses broad discretion -to find, investigate, and prosecute
violations of articles 85 and 86. In addition, subject to the ultimate review by
the European Court of Justice, the Commission, through its various decisions
and notices, is the primary interpreter of the broad conceptual terms
contained in articles 85 and 86. Moreover, as already indicated, the Commission possesses the discretionary powers to grant or deny negative clear3
ances and specific exemptions under article 85(3).1
148. See generally Mann, The Dyestuff's Case in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 22 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 35 (1972).
149. Instituto Chemotherapico Italiano Sp. A. v. E.C. Comm'n, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
309, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. % 8209 (1974) (Eur. Ct. of Justice Case Nos. 6 &
7/73); Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt.

L.R. 199, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8171 (1973) (Eur.
Ct. of Justice Case No. 6/72). For a commentary on the Continental Can case, see Hurwitz, The Impact of the Continental Can Case on Combinations and Concentrations
Within the Common Market, 25 HAsT Ncs L.J. 469 (1974); Korah, The Control of Mer-

gers Under Article 86 of the Rome Treaty: Continental Can, 26
82 (1973); 11

SAN DIEGO

CURRENT LEG. PROB.

L. REv. 227 (1973).

150. See, inter alia, Communication from the Commission to the Council, presented

on Nov. 8, 1973, Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations, [1973]
BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 15.
151. See generally Dietz, Enforcement of Anti-Trust Laws in the EEC, 6 INT'L LAW.

742 (1972).
152. For a discussion of the composition and function of the European Commission

see note 30 supra.
153. For comparative discussion see Kobak, Three Approaches to the Bureaucratic
Dilemma: The Administration and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws of the United
States, France and the Common Market, 23 ALA. L. REv. 43.(1970).
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Complaints may come before the Commission from member states, persons or businesses having a legitimate interest, or on the Commission's own
initiative. Upon determining whether the complaint states sufficient grounds
for issuing a decision, the Commission possesses sweeping investigatory
power to obtain all information necessary to carry out its duties under
regulation 17. In making its decision, the Commission must grant the
undertaking involved the opportunity to present its views on the complaint
before the Commission, and any decision must be based solely on the facts
upon which the parties have had an opportunity to express themselves. The
Commission may sanction an offender by (a) requiring the undertaking to
terminate the infringement, and/or (b) imposing periodic fines upon the
undertaking for such infringements or continuing infringements. If the
undertaking in question is domiciled within a member state, such decisions
are directly applicable within such member states. The rules of civil procedure enforced in that member state govern the ultimate enforcement proce154
dure.
IV.

ADDITIONAL COMMUNITY MEASURES AFFECTING
COMMERCIAL UNDERTAKINGS

'In addition to the various Community measures which affect the primary
modes of doing business within the Community, the Community law pertaining to the activities of commercial undertakings extends to such other matters
as corporate law, 1 5 taxation," 6 labor law and social security systems, 157
regional aids,' 58 capital movements, 59 transportation,' 60 and bankruptcy
matters.'" This section briefly analyzes the role Community law plays with
respect to matters of company law and taxation.
A.

Company Law

The Treaty of Rome views the harmonization of European company
laws as intermeshing with the achievement of the right of establishment
throughout the Community and the abolition of all barriers to the institution
of a unified internal market structure. 16 2 Moreover, this harmonization is
154. See generally Graupner, Commission Decision-Making on Competition Questions, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 291 (1973).
155. See notes 162-95 infra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 196-209 infra and accompanying text.
157. See European Commission, Preliminary Guidelines for a Community Social
Policy Program in the Community, [1971] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 2. See also Jett, The
Free Movement of Labor in the E.E.C., 8 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 375 (1973).
158. See European Commission, Report on the Regional Problems in the Enlarged
Community, [1973] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 8. See also C. FLOCKTON, COMMUNITY REGIONAL POLICY (PEP Eur. Ser. No. 15, 1970).
159. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET (SEGRA REPORT) (1966); 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 1601-1782
(1974).
160. See European Commission, Common Transport Policy: Objectives and Programme, [1973] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 16. See also DESPICHT, THE TRANSPORT POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (PEP Eur. Ser. No. 12, 1969).
161. See note 187 infra.
162. The phrase "European company laws" refers to the nine respective national
systems of company laws existing within the Community.
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viewed as enhancing beneficial "European" corporate activity while safeguarding shareholder, creditor, and employee rights through various technical
schemes and provisions for the disclosure of pertinent information -to the
public. The harmonization of company laws is not an end in itself, but is an
additional means provided by the Treaty for insuring that its basic objectives
are realized. 163
In harmonizing the company laws the decision-making organs of the
Community have approached the matter in two distinct fashions. First, in
instances where disparities between the company laws of the member states
tend to create discriminatory barriers, the Commission and Council of
Ministers have sought, typically through the use of a directive, to require the
member states to amend their respective national laws so as to approximate
uniform corporate law conditions throughout the Community. Secondly, in
the absence of any national mechanism for facilitating desirable "European"
corporate activities, the Commission has pressed either through international
conventions or a Community regulation, to institute new international or
64
Community mechanisms.'
Company Law Directives. Under the powers granted by article 54(3)(g) of
the Treaty of Rome, the Commission has presented five formally proposed
directives on company laws and an additional directive on security prospectuses to the Council of Ministers for consideraton.' l 5 By its nature, a directive is addressed to the individual member states and requires them to conform
their municpal laws to the requirements set forth by the directives, while
leaving the member states the choice of form and methods for achieving this
conformity.' 66 To date, only the first of the following company law
directives has been adopted by the Council of Ministers.
First Directive o1 March 9, 1968.167 This directive pertains to the con-

tractual capacity of companies limited by shares (both public- and privatetype) companies' 6" and their directors, disclosure of important information
regarding the company, and questions of nullity of the company.' 6 9 With
respect to disclosure, this directive requires each member state to maintain a
central company registry at which is to be filed such specific information as
chartered documents and amendments thereto, the names of directors and
company officers, the subscribed capital, and any changes in registered
offices. Except for private companies, the annual balance sheet and profit
RENAULD, DROIT EUROPLEN DES SOCIETIS (1969); E. STEIN,
OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS--NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNA-

163. See generally J.
HARMONIZATION

TIONAL COORDINATION ( 197 1).

164. See Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law Scene, in THE HAR-

MONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 3 (1973).

165. See generally EUROPEAN COMPANY LAw T ExTs (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1974).
166. See Treaty of Rome art. 189.
167. See Council of Ministers Directive 681151, 11 E.E.C. J.O. L65/8, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 1355 (1968).
168. The terms "public company" and "private company" as used herein refer to
the distinction employed in English company law, and not as in the United States. See
generally L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (4th ed. 1972).
169. For discussion of the various corporate forms existing in the national systems
within the Community, see generally R. PENNINGTON, COMPANIES IN THE COMMON
MARKET (2d ed. 1970).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

and loss account must also be filed and made available for public inspection.
In addition, all corporate stationery and order forms are to bear the name of
the relevant national registry and the company's register number. Each filing
of required corporate information is to be publicly reported in a national
newspaper.
With respect to the validity of corporate obligations, the directive establishes the principle that a third party contracting with a company should be
able to rely on the act being within the objects and powers of the company,
provided that the act is done by "the organs" of the company. Accordingly,
acts done by the board of directors are binding upon the company, even if
beyond the objects of the company, unless such acts in fact contravene the
law. This curtailment of the ultra vires doctrine does not pertain to the
relationship of the company to its own shareholders and directors.
With respect to the questions of company nullity, the directive compromises between conflicting views of continental corporate law.' 70 The municpal
corporate laws may permit dissolution of a company on the grounds of
nullity only by a court order based on certain specific grounds (e.g., the object
of the company is illegal or contrary to public policy). Nullity, however, does
not of itself alter the validity of any commitments entered into by or with the
company, and the shareholders remain liable for any debts owed on
subscribed shares to the extent that obligations to company creditors so
7 1.
require.
Second Draft Directive. 72 The purpose of the Second Draft Directive is
to set certain minimum requirements for the formation of companies limited
by shares, increases or reductions of capital, and the distribution of dividends. The minimum standards for charter documents of a company
generally conform with existing continental practice. The most significant
aspect on formation is that a minimum capital of 25,000 units of account on
subscriptions for a company is required. If on formation the shares are to be
purchased for cash, they must be paid up to at least twenty-five percent. If
the shares are issued for other valuable consideration, a valuation of this
consideration and the shares issued against it must be made by an independent expert and official notification must be given of this valuation. Similar
rules apply to shares issued on increase of capital.
The Second Draft Directive requires that dividends be distributable only
out of realized profits and only to the extent that corporate assets exceed its
authorized capital plus any non-distributable reserves. In addition, companies may not acquire their own shares by subscription. The rights of a
company generally to purchase its own shares are subject, at the discretion of
the member states, to the following conditions: (a) the voting rights of the
shares shall be suspended; (b) where the shares are included in the balance
sheet as assets, a non-distributable reserve shall be shown of the same
170. See E.

STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS

306 (1971).

171. Generally on the first directive see Ault, Harmonization of Company Law in
the European Economic Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (1968).

172. See Proposed Council of Ministers Directive, 13 E.E.C. J.O. C48/8, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.

1371A (1973).
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amount on the liability side of the balance sheet; (c) a directors' report must
give full publicity relating to the acquired shares.
Any increase or reduction of authorized capital is subject to the general
provision concerning minimum capital and reserve and to the requirement of
a formal majority decision by a special meeting of shareholders. With respect
to increases of authorized capital, the shareholders have preemptive rights
unless the relevant charter documents provide otherwise. Where authorized
capital is reduced for any reason except for a downward adjustment of
certain assets, outstanding corporate creditors possess the right to claim
repayment or additional security.
Third Draft Directive.173 The objective of the Third Draft Directive is to
establish certain minimum standards for coordinating the municipal company
laws of the member states with respect to internal mergers of public-type
companies. This directive is essentially concerned with mergers involving the
acquisition of one company by another, or the formation of a new company,
or the acquisition of one company by another company which is its sole
shareholder.
At present the national laws of the member states relating to these types of
mergers differ considerably. 174 The draft directive endeavors to set forth
standards concerning the preparation and approval of a "merger plan," the
consultation with employees regarding the legal, economic, and social impact
of the merger, and the safeguarding of creditors' rights. The draft directive
has been prepared in a manner to be aligned with the provisions of a
proposed draft convention on international mergers in the Community.' 7"
Fourth Draft Directive.17 6 The thrust of this directive, which applies both
to public- and private-type companies, is to establish throughout the Community uniform requirements regarding the extent of financial information that
should be made available to the public by companies. The draft directive
prescribes a standardized format for the balance sheet and profit and loss
accounts. In addition, uniform minimum standards for coordinating different
methods of valuing assets and liabilities presently in effect within the
member states are set forth.
Fifth Draft Directive.177 This directive, which is perhaps the most far
reaching and controversial of all the directives, is concerned with the
coordination of the municipal laws of the member states with respect to the
structure of public-type companies and the powers and obligations of their
various corporate organs. The draft directive provides for a two-tier board
comprised of a managing board responsible for managing and representing
the company, and a supervisory board responsible for controlling the management organ. In addition, there is employee participation in the manage173. See Proposed Council of Ministers Directive, 13 E.E.C. J.O. C89/20, 1 CCH
1381 (1973).
174. See generally King, Commentary on Acquisitions and Mergers in the Common
Market, 37 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 341 (1972).
175. See note 188 infra and accompanying text.
176. See Proposed Council of Ministers Directive, 15 E.E.C. J.O. C7/11, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. RElP.
1391, [1971] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 12.
177. See Proposed Council of Ministers Directive, 15 E.E.C. J.O. C1311149, 1 CCH
COMM. MKxT. RE'.
1401, [1972] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 10.
COMM. MKT. REP.
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Also, uniform minimum

of shareholders and the
standards are set regarding the annual meeting
78
appointment and role of independent auditors.1
Draft Directive Pertaining to Prospectuses.7 9 This unnumbered draft
directive requires certain information to be provided at the time of a grant of
quotation. The goals of this directive are to avoid undermining the confidence of holders of European securities which would result from the
dissemination of differing information about companies, and to provide
effective protection for investors irrespective of where the security is quoted.
This directive is applicable to all securities (i.e., shares, common stock,
convertible and other debentures) admitted or introduced for official quotation on a stock exchange located within a member state. Specific provisions
of this draft directive are highly complex and detailed.
International Conventions. The Treaty of Rome empowers the member
states, "so far as is necessary," to enter into negotiations with each other with
respect to various company law related matters.1 80 To date the Community
has taken the initiative in the following areas:
The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies.'8 ' The rights
of a commerical undertaking to be recognized as a legal entity within the
member states is essential if a company intends to do business in that state.
An unrecognized company would be precluded from the right of establishment because it could not operate as a lawful entity in that jurisdiction. The
Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and ,Bodies Corporate,
which though signed by representatives of the six original member states, has
not yet been ratified by all the signatories and is not yet in force, endeavors
to insure that companies established within a member state will be recognized in other member states. The convention attempts to reconcile two
conflicting theories of corporate recognition-the incorporation theory and
the "real seat" theory-by adopting the main thesis of the incorporation
theory as qualified by certain exceptions rooted in the "real seat" theory.
The incorporation theory premises corporate recognition upon incorporation
and the maintenance of a registered office within a member state. The "real
seat" theory makes a corporate recognition contingent upon the existence 1of
82
a company's central administration with a member of the Community.
Under the compromise theory a company incorporated in one of the member
states and which has its registered office in such state is entitled to recognition
as of right in the other member states. However, recognition may be refused
if the company has its "real registered office" outside the territorial bounds of
the Community and has "no genuine link with the economy of one of the said
178. For an interesting comparative discussion of the main features of European
company laws, many of which are embraced in the Fifth Draft Directive, see Conard,

Company Laws of the European Communities from an American Viewpoint, in THE
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 45 (1973).
179. See Proposed Council of Ministers Directive, 15 E.E.C. J.O. C131/61, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 1405, [1972] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 8.
180. See Treaty of Rome art. 220.
181. See 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 6083, [1969] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 2.
182. For discussion of "real seat" and incorporation theories of corporate recognition
see G. ZAPmRiou, EUROPEAN BUSINss LAw 125-32 (1970).
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territories."'1 88 This compromise theory is ambiguous and potentially dangerous for the American enterprise doing business within -the Community
because the possibility exists that conflicting interpretations of the terms "real
registered office" and "genuine link with the economy" among the various
member states could impair the mobility of the American enterprise through84
out the Community.1
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and
Commercial Matters.185 This convention, which became operative among
the original member states of the Community in 1973, attempts to provide
legal security and predictability with regard to the enforcement of judgments
across national frontiers within the Community. Thus, the convention is a
further safeguard for creditors' rights in Community commercial transactions.
The convention prescribes a detailed system of rules regarding the assumption of jurisdiction.'8 6 A supplementary convention establishing uniform
standards for individual and corporate bankruptcy proceedings is presently
7
being considered by the Community.' 8
Draft Convention on InternationalMergers.' s8 This convention is complementary to the Third Draft Directive on the harmonization of company laws,
and to a large extent the structure of the convention parallels that of the
draft directive. The objective of the convention is to facilitate transnational
mergers between Community enterprises, while providing adequate protection for shareholders, creditors, and employees.
Council Regulations. The Community has also tried to harmonize company
laws through the promulgation of regulations, which are Community laws
of general application and are binding and directly applicable in all member
states.' 8 9 Examples of this approach are the Draft Regulation on the Control
of Mergers,' 90 the proposed Statute for the European Company, and the
Draft Regulation for European Cooperation Grouping.
Draft Statute for the European Company.1 9' Since the early 1960's considerable discussion in Community circles has been given to the adoption of a
statutory form for European corporations. In 1970 the European Commission produced a Draft Regulation on a European Company (S.E.),1 92 which
was based to a large extent upon an earlier draft produced by a group of
183. See Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate,
supra note 181, art. 3.
184. For further discussion on convention see Stein, Conflict-of-Laws Rules by
Treaty: Recognition of Companies in a Regional Market, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1327
(1970).
185. See 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 6003, [1969] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 2.
186. For further discussion see B. GOLDMAN, EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL LAW 412-21
(1973); Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention-Its Threat and Challenge
to Americans, 8 INT'L LAW. 446 (1974).
187. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 148.
188. See generally European Commission, Report on Draft Convention on the International Merger of Socidt6s Anonymes, [1973] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 13.
189. Treaty of Rome art. 189.
190. See note 188 supra and accompanying text.
191. See 13 E.E.C. J.O. C124/1 (1970); [1970] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 8; CCH
COMM. MKT. REP., EUROPEAN STOCK CORPORATION (spec. pub. 1969).
192. For historical background of S.E. see generally D. THOMPSON, THE PROPOSAL
FOR A EURoPEAN COMPANY (1969).
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distinguished European corporate law experts. As presently projected, the
S.E. corporate form would be under European law and would exist side by
side with the existing national corporate forms. The primary rationale behind
this new corporate form is the facilitation of larger concentrations of
economic power within the Community by "European" enterprises, especially small- and medium-size ones. From the point of view of the American
enterprise, the draft regulation precludes any direct foreign use of the S.E.
form, on the principle that it is imperative that all companies involved in the
formation of an S.E. company be completely within the jurisdiction of the
Community. As the S.E. may only be formed by stock companies incorporated under the laws of the member states, an American enterprise could use
the S.E. form only indirectly through a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated
within the Community. 193 Other significant aspects of the S.E. are its
espousal of the two-tier corporate board form and the concept of "workers'
participation.

' 194

Draft Regulation on European Cooperation Grouping (ECG).' 9 5

The

ECG will be a new legal vehicle under Community law primarily designed to
facilitate cooperation between enterprises established under the law of
different member states, regardless of their legal status or size. The ECG will
be established by contract and is intended to be a flexible vehicle suitable for
the temporary pooling of certain economic and commercial resources. Members of an ECG will be jointly responsible toward third parties. As with the
proposed S.E., the ECG will be subject to normal tax rules. With respect to
the taxation of European companies and of international mergers, the
Community is presently considering a series of proposals.
B.

Taxation

Governmental taxation and fiscal policies are not merely revenue-raising
devices; they are used also as devices for adjusting and stabilizing national
economies. In this respect, a tax policy is important to the Community from
the point of view of the achievement of the basic "four freedoms" guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome, and is an essential element in the broader
picture of economic and monetary union envisioned by the Community.
Accordingly, as the Community progresses toward its proclaimed goal of
economic and monetary union, greater emphasis is being placed upon the
harmonization of the existing tax system of the member states of the
Community.l 96
193. For further discussion of draft regulation see generally Norton, A Cheshire Cat

Affair: The European-type Company and Its Meaning for the American Enterprise in

the European Community, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 111 (1973); Sanders, The European
Company on Its Way, 8 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 29 (1971); Vagts & Waelde, Societay
Europaea: A Future Option for U.S. Corporations?,29 Bus. LAW. 823 (1974).
194. Generally on the notion of "workers participation" or "co-determination" see
Fabricus, Co-Determination in the European Company Law, in THE HARMONIZATION OF
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 101 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1973); Vagts, Reforming the Modern
Corporation: Perspective from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1966).
195. See Proposed Council of Ministers Regulation, [1974] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 1.
196. See generally Communication from the Commission to Council on the progress
achieved in the first stage of economic and monetary union, on the allocation of powers
and responsibilitiesamong the Community institutions and the Member States essential
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Largely due to the sensitive political implications of tampering with any
tax system, the Treaty of Rome did not attempt to replace the existing tax
systems of the member states. ,Instead, the Treaty aims at a harmonization of
the existing systems along Community guidelines. l9 7 The specific provisions
of the Treaty of Rome dealing with tax or fiscal provisions are articles 95-99.
Article 95 sets forth the basic Community rule of nondiscrimination in
matters of internal taxation against imports from other member states.
Article 96 prohibits refunds on exports exceeding the actual taxation imposed on the goods. Article 97 is a transitional provision which imposes
average tax rates in implementing articles 95 and 96 within member states
still operating a cumulative, multi-stage, or cascade turnover tax system.
Article 98, unlike the former articles which deal with indirect taxation, deals
by negative inference with matters of direct taxation. This article specifically
prohibits remissions and repayments in respect of exports to other member
states, and the imposition of countervailing charges in respect of imports
from member states, save with prior Community authorization. Article 99
provides the legal basis for all Community measures concerning the harmonization of national laws on indirect taxation.
Direct Taxation. While the Treaty of Rome is primarily concerned with
matters of indirect taxation, the European Commission has also moved to
harmonize the area of direct taxation pursuant to the broad powers granted
by article 100 of the Treaty of Rome. The Commission's efforts are directed
not toward personal income taxation, but toward corporate taxation, mainly
with respect to corporate profits and dividends. 198
The Commission is concerned with the problem of international double
taxation of dividends and interest. The Commission proposes to resolve this
problem by extending and improving the existing network of bilateral
conventions between the member states for the avoidance of international
double taxation; the ultimate result would be a multilateral Community
treaty. 199
To date, the Commission has also submitted several draft directives to the
Council pertaining to the harmonization of existing national laws regarding
taxation of mergers and similar transactions related to the taxation of parent
and subsidiary companies. At present, there exist no common rules among
the member states with respect to defining parent-subsidiary relationship for
tax purposes, and in the case of cross-frontier mergers, a company being
"absorbed" will generally suffer adverse tax consequences. The thrust behind
the proposed draft directives is the facilitation of growth and modernization
20 0
of truly "European" enterprises.
to the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, and on the measures to be
taken in the second stage of economic and monetary union, [1973] BULL. E.C. Supp.

No. 5 (presented by the Commission to the Council on April 30, 1973).
197.

1967).

198.

INT'L

See generally
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(C. Shoup ed.

See generally Anschutz, Harmonization of Direct Taxes in the EEC, 13 HIA .

L.J. 1 (1972).

199. See European Commission, Programme for the Harmonization of Direct Taxes,
[1967] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 8.

200. See 12 E.E.C. J.O. C39/1 and 7 (1969).

The fate of these proposals is still
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With respect to the actual taxation of corporate income, the Commission
favors a common system which will partially lighten the economic burden of
double taxation of dividends brought about by taxing the dividend both at
the corporate and the shareholder level. The solution primarily advocated for
this problem is a tax credit deductible from the shareholder's -tax.201 The
Commission has also embarked on various other schemes (e.g., in the area of
withholding tax rates) to harmonize the corporate taxation system within the
202
Community.
Indirect Taxes. The term "indirect taxation" includes sales taxes, turn-over
taxes, excise taxes, and stock capital taxes. The primary concern of the
Treaty of Rome's tax provisions on indirect taxation is with respect to intraCommunity imports and exports.
Value-Added Tax (VAT). The VAT is a noncumulative, multi-stage
system whereby a tax is levied only on the net value of the products or
services concerned. In general terms, the VAT is a tax on consumption
levied on the utilization of goods and services by the final consumer and paid
to the proper authorities piecemeal by the various intermediaries along the
chain of production and distribution. At each stage the seller simply pays the
difference between the tax levied on the sale and the tax he paid the
suppliers when he bought the goods. While in the final analysis the burden
of the VAT falls on the consumer, its main advantage lies in a proportional
disbursement of the tax rate throughout the chain of production and
distribution, with the resulting elimination of national tax frontiers and
203
systems.
The VAT system will be established throughout the Community in various
stages. 20 4 During the first stage, the general structuring and procedure of the
VAT system will be incorporated into the existing national tax structures,
though rates of taxes are not harmonized in the member states.20 5 The
undecided, although the Council of Ministers has taken note that some decision should
be made as to parent-subsidiary relations before Jan. 1, 1975, and as to merger prior to
Jan. 1, 1976.
201. At present, three basic systems of corporate taxation exist in the Community:
the "classical"; "split-rate"; and "imputation" methods. The classical method entails
corporate taxation on gross profits before dividend distribution, followed by personal income taxation on the dividends so distributed. The split-rate method is similar to the
classical system, except that distributed or non-distributed profits are taxed at varying
rates. The imputation method permits shareholders to offset a proportion of the corporate tax paid on the company's profits against his own income tax liability. For further discussion see the report made on behalf of the European Commission by Professor
A.J. von den Tempel, Imp6t sur les socidtds et imp6t sur le rdvenu dans les Commun-

autds europernes, ETuDEs SkRIE CONCURRENCE No. 15 (1970), which favors the classical system. However, the trend in the member states is toward the imputation system
and the Commission appears now to favor such a position. See [1973] BULL. E.C. No.
11, at 23-24. For some of its possible effects of American investors see Taylor, U.S.
Tax Treaties and Common Market Corporate Tax Systems, 28 TAx LAw. 73 (1974).

202. No Community action has been taken to date with respect to withholding taxes.
203. For discussion of general aspects of VAT see EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES PRESS

AND INFORMATION,

THE

VALUE-ADDED TAX IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(1970).

204. The first stage of the VAT system was scheduled to commence in 1970 but was
postponed until 1972.
205. See generally Council of Ministers Directives Nos. 67/227 and /228, 10 E.E.C.
3111, 3135 (1974); Council of MinJ.O. 1301, 1303, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
3161
isters Directive No. 69/463, 12 E.E.C. J.O. L320/34, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
(1974).
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Commission has recently submitted to the Council of Ministers a draft
directive fixing a common basis of assessment for the VAT. 20 6
Excise Taxes. The term excise tax generally refers to any tax on privileges, often assessed in the form of licenses or other fees. This tax is
generally imposed upon various luxury-type goods. Article 99 of the Treaty
of Rome provides for the harmonization of excise taxes, which presently vary
considerably in number and amount throughout the Community. In 1972 the
Commission proposed a series of draft directives and a draft decision on the
harmonization of excise taxes. The thrust of these directives and decision is
the establishment of five excise duties on tobacco, mineral oil, alcohol, wine,
,and beer, such duties to be applied according to the guidelines set forth in
the directives. All other forms of excise duties and indirect taxation would be
abolished or assimilated within the Community's value-added tax system. As
yet, nothing definitive has materialized in this area. 20 7
The Community has also adopted guidelines on the harmonization of legal
and administrative provisions governing turnover taxes applicable to passenger travel and on tax and duty exemptions on the importation of small
20 8
consignments of goods to private individuals.
Taxes on Authorized Capital. Taxes on the authorized capital of undertakings continue to constitute an important source of income for most
member states. To date, the Council of Ministers has adopted two directives
209
harmonizing the rates of capital issue taxes.
V.

CONCLUSION

The substance of this Article has briefly surveyed the major laws of the
European Economic Community which affect American business within the
Community. From the point of view of the American businessman and
attorney, the next decade undoubtedly will produce a further development of
Community commercial laws, especially as the Community moves closer
toward its goal of complete economic and monetary union. 210 However, the
206. Proposal for a sixth Council Directive on the harmonization of Member States
concerning turnover taxes. Common system of value added tax: Uniform basis of assessment, [1973] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 11, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. [ 3165 (submitted to the Council by the Commission on June 29, 1973).
207. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 16465.
208. See [1972] BULL. E.C. Supp. No. 7.
209. For discussions see [19731 BULL. E.C. No. 4, at 27.
210. Moves to insure that the integration process will take the European Community
beyond the basic customs union concept toward complete economic and monetary union
(EMU) followed closely the establishment of the EEC in 1958. After a sporadic history during the 1960's, a model for EMU was finally agreed upon by the Council of
Ministers structured along the lines of the Werner Plan. See Report to the Council and
Commission on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the
Community of October 8, 1970, [1970] BULL. E.C. Supp. to No. 11. The Council of
Ministers and the member states view EMU coming about through a series of three successive stages. The first stage has already commenced. The commencement of the second stage, which was expected to be completed before the end of 1980, was expected
during 1974; however, because of the internal and international difficulties the Community has delayed commencement. The third stage, which was left undefined, would result
in complete EMU, i.e., the Community would supplant the member states in the decision-making process in the economic and monetary areas. At least theoretically, because of the interaction between political and economic decisions, the political integra-
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European Community cannot be viewed simply in terms of a commercial
arrangement. Rather, notwithstanding continuing political turbulence within
the Community, 211 economic necessity has stimulated a process of European
integration, and this process, at least on a fundamental level, appears to be
"irreversible. '212 What is ultimately happening in Western Europe is a
political commitment to control and manage the economic and monetary
affairs of Western Europe on a "supranational" level-to create a union

which, if achieved, can provide the underpinnings for ultimate European
213
political integration.

tion of the Community is thought to be enhanced by EMU. For recent statements on
the Community's political will to pursue EMU see Final Communiqu6 Emanating from
the Paris Summit Conference of the Heads of Government of the European Community,
[1972] BULL. E.C. No. 10, at 14, and No. 11, at 9 (held on Oct. 19 & 20, 1972).
Also see Subsequent Communiqu6s of the Heads of the Member States at the December
1973 Summit Conference in Copenhagen on 14 & 15 Dec. 1973, [1973] BULL. E.C.
No. 12, at 9, and the Second Paris Summit on 9 & 10 Dec. 1974, [1974] BULL. E.C.
No. 12, at 7.
211. For example, the Government of the United Kingdom insisted upon some form
of renegotiation of accession terms to the Community, and promised the British electorate a referendum on the issue (which referendum has proved favorable to continuing
British entry in the EEC). For further discussion of the United Kingdom's position
see generally [1974] BULL. E.C. No. 3, at 14, and No. 12, at 11. For recent discussion
of general internal problems of the Community see comments by Dr. Ralph Dahrendorf
(former E.C. Commissioner and now Director of the London School of Economics) in
[1974] European Community No. 182, at 11.
212. See Final Communiqu6 of 1969 Hague Summit, supra note 29:
Over and above the technical and legal sides of the problems involved, the
expiry of the transitional period . . . has, therefore, acquired major political significance. Entry upon the final stage of the Common Market not
only means confirming the irreversible nature of the work accomplished
by the Communities, but also means paving the way for a United Europe
capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of
making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission.
213. For example, see Address by Mr. Sicco Mansholt, former president of the
Commission of the European Communities, at the first Paris Summit Conference in October 1972, [1972] BULL. E.C. No. 11, at 57, 58:
[A]ll we built so far and all we shall be building from now on is aimed
primarily at the progress of our Community toward the political union of
our countries, and of all countries in Europe whose economic development
and political governance is such that they will be capable in times to come
of sharing fully in that union. .

.

. Accordingly, the Commission feels it

to be of the highest importance that the Conference of Heads of State or
Government should emphasize the will to go forward, and parallel with
the advance toward economic and monetary union, with the purpose of ultimately establishing a real European Government, possessing the necessary powers and answerable to a European Parliament freely elected by
universal suffrage.

